Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law by Williams, Jack F.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-1991
Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer
Law
Jack F. Williams
Georgia State University College of Law, jwilliams@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Accounting Law Commons, and the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 Bankr. Dev. J. 55 (1991).




The delightful quality of fraud lies in its infinite variety ....
INTRODUCTION
The difficulty of attempting to apply fraudulent transfer law to mod-
ern transactions is the struggle of "apply[ing] a law with its origins in
16th century England to a financial transaction [a leveraged buyout]
which did not exist on a large scale until the late 1980s. "2 Although a
part of the rich fabric of English common law at least since 13 Statute
Elizabeth' and Twyne's Case,4 fraudulent transfer law has undergone a
revival in its application to modern transactions. What can be gleaned
from this evolving body of law is that modern fraudulent transfer cases
are often difficult to understand.' Like the study of equity jurisprudence,
* United States Coast Guard Academy; University of Oklahoma, B.A., 1982; George Washing-
ton University Law Center, J.D., 1985. Associate, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas. I thank William
B. Finkelstein, Esq., David Weitman, Esq., and Basil H. Mattingly, Esq., for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Marie Kenning, Diana Tunnell, and Laurie Mayer for
aiding in the preparation of this article. This article was not prepared for or in contemplation of any
matter in which my firm is or I am counsel. Although I represent almost exclusively creditors (prefer-
ably those who have given value in good faith), we have represented parties on various sides of the
issues discussed. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 232 (1965).
The views expressed are my own.
G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 325a, at 566 (rev. ed. 1940).
Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (footnote
omitted) (analysis of leveraged buyout as fraudulent transfer).
" Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), repealed by The Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5,
ch. 20, § 172 (1925). The Act was penal in nature, with the English Crown receiving as a penalty
one-half of all property recovered. See Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of
Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REV. 469, 473 & n.19
(1988). The Act prohibited conveyances made with the "intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors
and others of their just and lawful actions." 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1571).
Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
£ See generally Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72
MINN. L. REV. 449 (1988); Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985);
Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829
(1985).
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just when you believe you are on the verge of grasping the central theme,
you run smack into a countervailing principle that shakes the foundation
of your knowledge. And like the wide-eyed child who sees ghosts every-
where once the lamps are dimmed, you seem to encounter fraudulent
transfer risks at many corners in the negotiation and construction of mod-
ern transactions.6
The purpose of this article is. to distill the large body of fraudulent
transfer law with an eye toward mapping its contours, both positively and
normatively. While mapping the contours, the article attempts to define
the proper limits of fraudulent transfer law and, in the process, remain
faithful to its basic tenets. It is this task that has captured the attention of
commentators and courts alike.' In attempting to bring order to this area
of the law, the article necessarily stands on the theoretical scaffolding con-
structed by the courts and commentators to see past the morass of con-
fused cases to a workable model that reunites fraudulent transfer law with
its equitable roots.
I. PURPOSES OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW
Sections 548(a) and 544(b) (incorporating state fraudulent transfer
law) of the Bankruptcy Code" recognize the power of the trustee to chal-
lenge transfers or obligations incurred as fraudulent transfers. Section
548(a) provides:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily-
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); see also 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) (incorporates state fraudulent
transfer law in bankruptcy). Although this article will pay appropriate homage to the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (hereinafter UFCA) where appropriate, it will specifically address the
concerns generated by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (hereinafter UFTA).
' See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 5; Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts
and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781 (1988); Carlson, supra note 5; Baird &
Jackson, supra note 5.
3 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bank-
ruptcy Judges, United States Trustee and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and,
Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].
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(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result
of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property
remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would in-
cur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as
such debts matured.9
Section 544(b) authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfers by the
debtor that an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim"0 could avoid
under state fraudulent transfer law." Under Section 544(b), the trustee's
cause of action rises and falls under state law; therefore, one must ac-
quaint oneself with the elements of state fraudulent transfer law. Al-
though the UFTA'2 is similar in many respects to Section 548, some
states such as New York'" still operate under the UFCA' 4 and some
states like Texas 5 have adopted nonuniform amendments to the UFTA.1'
* 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (allowance of claims).
" 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988). Section 544(b) provides:
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor hold-
ing an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502(e) of this title.
Id.
Is 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). For a thorough review of the UFCA and UFTA, see Kennedy, The
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1986); Alces & Dorr, A Critical
Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 UNIv. OF ILi.. L. REV. 527; Vener,
Transfers and Frauds of Creditors Under the Uniform Acts and the Bankruptcy Code, 92 CoMM.
L.J. 218 (1987); Shupack, Confusion and Policy and Language in the Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act, 9 CARDoZo L. REV. 811 (1987).
Is N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81 (McKinney 1990).
14 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918).
16 TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987).
16 See generally Dole & Teofan, The Nonuniform Texas "Uniform" Fraudulent Transfer Act,
42 Sw. L.J. 1029 (1989).
Although beyond the scope of this article, one issue that has so far avoided the collective eye of
19911
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Section 548 grants to the trustee the power to avoid fraudulent trans-
fers accomplished with either actual or constructive fraudulent intent.17
One must, of course, start with the actual language of Section 54818 in
assessing whether a particular transfer is fraudulent. Courts, however,
also tend to explore the multitude of purposes behind Section 548 in de-
scholars in this area is the conflict of laws issues generated by even a simple fraudulent transfer case.
For example, Fred Sanford owns a very successful junk yard business located in California. The
business is a Delaware corporation eligible to conduct business in California. Most of Fred Sanford's
creditors are residents of California. Fred has a dedicated employee, Lamont, who is interested in
purchasing the business. Unfortunately, Lamont does not have the money to purchase the business
outright nor even to put forth a substantial down payment. Fred wants to retire and likes Lamont;
consequently, Fred and Lamont seek lenders willing to fund Lamont's purchase of the business. They
find a bank in Texas willing to provide 70% of the purchase price for a lien on all the business' assets.
The loan and security documents conspicuously state Texas law will control all issues arising under
or related to the transaction. The remaining 30% of the purchase price is provided by an insurance
company in return for the issuance of high-risk bonds. The documents here also provide that Texas
law will apply.
Two years after the transaction, the highly leveraged business defaults and seeks protection under
the Bankruptcy Code by filing a Chapter 11 petition. The debtor-in-possession then commences an
adversary proceeding under § 544(b) of the Code, which incorporates state fraudulent transfer law,
because of the inability to satisfy the one-year reach back period under § 548. Which state law ap-
plies? Delaware, the place of incorporation? California, the location of the business and its assets and
of the perfection of the Texas bank's lien in the assets? Texas, the location of one of the debtor's
largest creditors and the jurisdiction identified in loan and security documents as controlling on issues
arising from the transfer?
Lest the patient reader believe this to be more an academic issue than a practical one, let me
make just a few points. Delaware has enacted the UFCA. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301-12 (1953).
Consequently, Delaware law would require the trustee to prove lack of fair consideration (an ex-
change for less than fair value coupled with lack of good faith) as a precondition to avoiding the
transfers. See generally Cooch v. Grier, 30 Del. Ch. 255, 59 A.2d 282 (1948) (fair consideration
required). California has enacted the UFTA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.0-.12 (West 1986). Texas, too,
has enacted the UFTA, TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987), but with
substantial non-uniform amendments, including a non-exclusive definition of reasonably equivalent
value. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(b) (Vernon 1987). Thus, which state's law will
apply, like in many other areas of the law, will have substantive and strategic significance.
Again, to bring home this point is the recent preliminary analysis of the choice of law issues in
the fraudulent transfer context by Professor Barry Lewis Zaretsky, examiner in the Revco bank-
ruptcy. See "Preliminary Report of Examiner Professor Barry Lewis Zartsky" in In re Revco D.S.,
Inc., 118 Bankr. 468, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990). Professor Zaretsky's analysis of the choice of
law issues generated by the Revco leveraged transaction is thorough and illuminating. Id. at 500-04.
" For a thorough account of the common law history of fraudulent transfers, see 1 G. GLENN,
supra note 1, at §§ 58-62b. For an analysis of some of the policy goals embodied in fraudulent
transfer laws, see Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505
(1977). For an introduction to fraudulent transfer laws, see D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS
AND CREDrrORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 120-27, 490-92 (2d ed. 1982).
" "Since Code § 548 is largely derived from § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, . . . case
law under the former statute is a useful tool in construing [the present statute's] meaning and in-
tended purpose." Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653, 656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (foot-
note omitted), affd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984).
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termining whether the transfer before them should be avoided. This,
therefore, is where our inquiry must begin.
The fraudulent transfer is an infringement of the creditor's right to
realize upon the available assets of its debtor.'9 The law imposes a sub-
stantive prohibition-the debtor may not dispose of its property with the
intent, actual or implied by law, of placing the property beyond the reach
of its creditors." "A debtor cannot manipulate his affairs in order to
shortchange his creditors and pocket the difference. Those who collude
with a debtor in these transactions are not protected either."'"
Although most commentators agree that the thrust of fraudulent
transfer law is to protect the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate, the
authorities appear confused about where the proper limits of fraudulent
transfer law should be drawn." Nowhere are the appropriate limits more
greatly debated than in the context of the application of fraudulent trans-
fer laws to the leveraged buyout."
In their seminal article, Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jack-
son criticized the application of fraudulent transfer law to leveraged
buyouts on the ground that these statutes should apply to invalidate only
sham transactions and gratuitous transfers.2 4 Thus, according to Profes-
sors Baird and Jackson, fraudulent transfer law should not upset any
arm's length transaction, regardless of whether the transaction harms
creditors.2 Consequently, Professors Baird and Jackson conclude that
leveraged buyouts should be categorically excluded from fraudulent trans-
1' See I G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 1. Not all infringements upon the creditor's right to realize
upon the available assets of the debtor are proscribed. For example, the fresh start policy may remove
assets from the creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988 & Supp. 1991); see also Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 725 n.1 (1984) (At times, an individual debtor can
avoid, for his own benefit, property interests held by entities other than himself which are similar to
his own interests.).
20 See Cook, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REV.
263, 266 (1980).
11 Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 829-30 (1985).
21 See generally supra notes 5 and 7.
" In its simplest form, a leveraged buyout is one where a group of investors, with little or no
funds, purchases the shares of a target corporation, borrowing the purchase price from a lender who
in turn takes a security interest in all the target's assets. Because the purchase price is retained by old
shareholders while the assets are fully encumbered by the new lender, unsecured creditors of the
target may lose the value of the target's assets upon liquidation. For a readable discussion of leveraged
buyouts, see Thompson, Engineering Your Own LBO, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 30,
1989, at 74-76. For a more complete discussion of various forms of leveraged buyouts, see Carlson,
supra note 5, at 80-83.
1' Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 840.
26 Id. at 833-35, 854.
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fer analysis because "[a] firm that incurs obligations in the course of a
buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan dead beat who sells his
sheep to his brother for a pittance."26 With this statement, Professors
Baird and Jackson show their hand: they view fraudulent transfer law
through an historical lens for the purposes not merely of gaining insight
into its application, but also of providing limits to its application. Their
view regarding the categorical exclusion of leveraged buyouts from fraud-
ulent transfer analysis is wholly consistent with the historical view that
fraudulent transfer laws were initially passed to prevent collusive transfers
between individual debtors and their families and friends.27 Unfortu-
nately, their view fails to appreciate several centuries of case law that has
time after time focused its efforts on protecting unsecured creditors from
the unjust diminution of their debtor's estate.
Professors Baird and Jackson correctly note that fraudulent transfer
law is a per se rule whose purpose is to "provide all the parties [to a
transaction] with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if
they had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal."12 8
A per se rule operates to constrain the conduct of parties to a credit trans-
action in addition to whatever specific terms they may choose to include in
the contract relating to the transaction. 9
Professors Baird and Jackson conclude that parties to a commercial
transaction would not generally include a fraudulent transfer provision in
spite of the potential for injury to creditors resulting from leveraged
buyouts. ° According to Professors Baird and Jackson, under ideal negoti-
ating circumstances, creditors do not seek to protect themselves against all
debtor transactions that could potentially injure creditors, but only against
those transactions that almost always result in injury, such as gratuitous
or sham transfers. Consequently, creditors would not seek a contractual
provision restricting a debtor's ability to engage in leveraged buyouts be-
cause creditors do not perceive such transactions as injurious to their
interest. 3 '
26 Id. at 852.
27 Id. at 829-32.
28 Id. at 835-36.
29 Id. at 836.
30 Id. at 853-54.
31 Id.; see Burns, The Fraudulent Conveyance Laws and the LBO Lender, 94 COMM. L.J. 268,
304 (1986). Baird's and Jackson's major premise, that creditors would include fraudulent transfer
protection if they truly thought it important, is weakened by a number of factors. The premise ignores
the host of nonconsensual creditors like taxing authorities, tort claimants, and government environ-
mental and pension fund claimants, historically vulnerable to the fraudulent transfer. See United
[Vol. 8
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In a thoughtful and well-reasoned article, Professor Kathryn Smyser
persuasively disagrees with Professors Baird and Jackson. 2 She recog-
nizes that leveraged buyouts adversely affect existing creditors of a com-
pany by reducing the assets available for the satisfaction of the obligations
owed to them. Furthermore, she understands, like Baird and Jackson, the
application of fraudulent transfer law to leveraged buyouts where actual
fraud existed, and, more importantly, where the debtor received less than
reasonably equivalent value (fair consideration under the UFCA) at a
time when it was in a precarious financial condition."
Professor Smyser correctly states that the Baird and Jackson observa-
tion regarding per se rules "misperceives the relationship between 'per se'
rules such as fraudulent conveyance laws and specifically negotiated con-
tractual provisions. "' She also remarks: "Creditors negotiate specific con-
tractual protection, and incur the costs associated with this process, only
when they assume that the applicable law-that is, the relevant body of
per se rules-does not protect them against a particular risk. To do other-
wise would be inefficient and redundant." 5
In condemning the application of fraudulent transfer law to lever-
aged buyouts, Professors Baird and Jackson paint with broad strokes. As
Professor Smyser cogently observes, fraudulent transfer analysis contains
two sets of limiting circumstances in the first instance-the requirements
of a precarious financial condition and the lack of reasonably equivalent
value. 8 As discussed below, not all transactions that result in a diminu-
tion of the debtor's estate are condemned by fraudulent transfer law. First,
fraudulent transfer law applies only to transfers made when a debtor's
financial circumstances are exceptionally precarious or become so as a re-
sult of the transfer.3 Second, fraudulent transfer law applies only to
transfers made under circumstances where the debtor receives less than
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1005 (1987). Moreover, a fraudulent transfer restriction would be in the nature of a negative
covenant, the value of which is often questionable, or an event of default under the collateral docu-
ments. Those creditors with sufficient economic power to extract such a condition are more likely to
take a security interest to protect themselves. See Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law & Leveraged
Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1512 (1987).
" See Smyser, supra note 7, at 791.
I' d.
I4 d.
' Id. at 789.
" Id. at 791.
'? Id. at 792.
1991]
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reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the property transferred.38
Both requirements must exist at the time of the challenged transfer. With-
out them, no fraudulent transfer exists. Professor Smyser asserts: "These
limitations cannot be overlooked in speculating about what types of per se
rules restricting debtor conduct creditors may favor." 9
Although it seems apparent why fraudulent transfer law would re-
quire lack of reasonably equivalent value as a precondition to the success-
ful challenge of a transfer, why do the statutes also require insolvency as a
precondition? Here, the commentators are generally in agreement.
Limiting the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to circumstances
of insolvency reflects a logical assessment of a change in circumstances
which transforms the inherent conflict of interest between debtor and credi-
tor present from the outset of every credit transaction into a much more
serious conflict. The use of insolvency as a trigger for liability in the fraud-
ulent conveyance statutes represents a determination that under circum-
stances of insolvency the risk of misconduct by those in control of a corpo-
rate debtor becomes so great that it is appropriate to afford creditors the
benefit of a per se rule restricting the corporation's conduct .... The insol-
vency threshold limits the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to
precisely those extraordinary circumstances in which creditors are likely to
oppose the challenged conveyance before it is made."
Section 548 transcends the dispute between a debtor and a creditor; it
brings into focus the claims of a debtor's other creditors that they have
been collectively deprived of recourse to a debtor's asset."' Thus, while
preference law under Section 54742 enforces the bargain (usually implied
by law) among the creditors to resort to collective creditor action in bank-
ruptcy,"8 fraudulent transfer law enforces the bargain between the debtor
38 Id.
11 Id. at 791. Notwithstanding the almost unanimous judicial rejection of the Baird and Jackson
view, Professor Zaretsky in his preliminary examiner's report pays it considerable (I' believe too
much) deference. See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
40 Smyser, supra note 7, at 795 (footnote omitted).
41 See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.s. 833 (1984).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
"' The legislative history for § 547 states:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way out
[Vol. 8
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and its creditors." Fraudulent transfer law protects creditors against mis-
behavior (actual or implied by law) by their debtor.45 Professor Jackson
remarked:
The rough contours of fraudulent conveyance law are easy to establish.
Classic fraudulent conveyance law is concerned with a debtor who manipu-
lates his assets so as to keep them from his creditors. When a debtor is
insolvent and must hand his assets over to his creditors, he has an incentive
to hide his assets, to gamble them away, or to cut the best possible deal with
a friend (whether or not the friend is a creditor). These types of actions
form the core behavior that classic fraudulent conveyance law is designed to
prevent. Actions taken to 'hinder, delay, or defraud' one's creditors are,
therefore, fraudulent."'
Blocking a debtor's attempt to place assets out of the reach of its
creditors with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud was the origi-
nal goal of fraudulent transfer law.47 Commentators are nearly unani-
mous in the view that creditors' collection law (including bankruptcy)
should contain a prohibition against actual fraudulent transfers. 8 The de-
of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors. Second, and
more important, the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality
of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater payment
than others of his class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 6138.
4' See Jackson, supra note 19, at 726, 777 (fraudulent transfer law adjusts rights of creditors
vis-i-vis the debtor); Clark, supra note 17, at 554-60.
45 Or, as Professors Jackson and Scott observe, fraudulent transfer law "responds to the well
understood problems of inappropriate self-interested behavior by managers and equity" of the debtor.
Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 170 (1989).
49 Jackson, supra note 19, at 778 (footnote omitted).
" In a thoughtful article, Professor McCoid recognizes that this type of transfer has its common
law roots in the "voluntary conveyance" and reminds all that the modern law of fraudulent transfer
has subtly merged the voluntary conveyance and the transfer for inadequate consideration (the subject
of most modern fraudulent transfer cases). See McCoid, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances:
Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEx. L. REV. 639, 642-49 (1983). See generally 1 G.
GLENN, supra note 1, §§ 275, 294, 298; 0. BuMP, A TREATISE UPON CONVEYANCES MADE BY
DEBTORS TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS §§ 57, 247 (rev. 4th ed. 1986).
" Cf Jackson, supra note 19, at 779 n.172 (citations omitted):
Had states not adopted fraudulent conveyance laws, a fraudulent conveyance rule in bank-
ruptcy probably would have been preferable to no rule at all, given the inherently insol-
vency-directed nature of fraudulent conveyance law. Since general fraudulent conveyance
laws are a standard feature of all jurisdictions, however, the wisdom of a separate bank-
ruptcy rule is substantially more dubious because of the bankruptcy incentives it creates...
. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code borrows from fraudulent conveyance law, but tinkers
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bate, however, begins with constructive fraudulent transfers. What are its
limitations? What policy is it intended to foster? What interests is it there
to protect?
The purpose of this article is not only to offer a critical analysis of
proposed fraudulent transfer policy paradigms, but also to deduce a work-
ing hypothesis that the courts and practitioners may employ, much like
the navigator with his sextant, to fix their position in the turbulent seas of
fraudulent transfer law. The normative question is: what should be the
theoretical explanation for invalidation in constructive fraudulent transfer
cases? The answer is a reasoned creditors' harm heuristic. Deduced from
cases, equity, and legislative history, the reasoned creditors' harm heuristic
asks one to view the transaction or proposed transaction from the point of
view of the debtor's unsecured creditors. At the time of the transfer, does
what is contemplated significantly harm the unsecured creditors at a time
when their debtor is in a precarious financial position, that is, is there a
diminution of the debtor's estate?49 If so, is there any reason to ignore
fraudulent transfer liability, that is, is the diminution unjust? 50 The first
inquiry is more scientific; the second, more artistic.
In its preface explaining the inclusion of a constructive fraud provi-
sion, the UFCA states: "There are many conveyances which wrong credi-
tors where an intent to defraud on the part of the debtor does not in fact
exist."" The note to UFCA Section 3 (defining fair consideration) con-
firms that injury to creditors was the UFCA's primary concern:
The cases relating to the subject of this section usually deal with the
amount of consideration as indicating whether there is a fraudulent intent
with it in a fashion that is often inexplicable. Compare UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT § 1 (1919) (definition of "conveyance") with Bankruptcy Code § 548(d) (definition
"transfer"). Compare UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1) (1919) (a wronged
creditor cannot recover from a "purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the
fraud at the time of purchase") with Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) (transferee "that takes for
value and in good faith has a lien on any interest transferred ... to the extent that [he]
gave value to the debtor"). This process has accelerated with the 1984 amendment.
Many of these distinctions have been eliminated in jurisdictions which have enacted the UFTA. But
see UFTA §§ 3(b), 6(5)(ii), 8(e)(1), 8(e)(2), 7A U.L.A. 639, 650, 659, 662 (1984).
"' See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d 725, 727 (11th
Cir. 1990) (reasonably equivalent value requirement exists to protect creditors against depletion of the
debtor's estate).
0 UFTA § 10 recognizes the defenses of estoppel, laches, and waiver. See UFTA § 10, 7A
U.L.A. 639, 666 (1984); see also Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988) (court recognized the
unfairness of allowing attacks by future creditors on prior transfers).
0' UFCA, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428 (1918).
[Vol. 8
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on the part of the grantor or collusion on the part of the grantee. It is
submitted that the real question in such cases is the good faith of the
grantee, and whether the consideration given by him is a reasonable
equivalent for the property received. 2
As Professor McCoid observes:
The UFCA was drafted against this varied landscape. . . . [T]he drafter's
eye was on the injury to creditors, not the behavior of the transferor or
transferee. Creditors suffer an economic loss when their insolvent debtor
transfers property for inadequate consideration. The debtor's remaining es-
tate, to which they look for satisfaction, is diminished. Of course, to the
extent that consideration is given there is no diminution. This fact presuma-
bly accounts for the protection of the transfers provided by section 9(2). The
UFCA and corresponding bankruptcy provisions seek to rectify the per-
ceived injury. The impulse to which they respond is very different from that
prohibiting transfers with actual fraudulent intent and voluntary convey-
ances. It is a kind of 'no fault' principle.5"
The UFTA also suggests that the focus of a constructive fraudulent
transfer is on value which, from a creditor's viewpoint, has utility.54 Sec-
tion 3 of the UFTA states:
"Value" is to be determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect a
debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the debtor's un-
secured creditors. Consideration having no utility from a creditor's view-
point does not satisfy the statutory definition.5
This analysis is no different if one employs Section 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code rather than state fraudulent transfer law under Section
544(b). Courts usually focus on the value received by the debtor, rather
than the value given by the transferee.5 This approach ensures max-
" NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 352 (1918); see McCoid, supra note 46, at 644; accord
Dole & Teofan, supra note 16, at 1029. For a discussion of the transferee's good faith requirement,
see generally Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REv. 495 (1983).
' McCoid, supra note 46, at 655-56.
See Shupack, Confusion in Policy and Language in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 811, 832 (1987).
" UFTA § 3, Comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 639, 650-51 (1984).
See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983) (in analyz-
ing stock redemption under § 548(a)(2), court held that value to be assessed is value received by
debtor, not value forfeited by transferee); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. (In
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imization of the creditors' welfare. One may argue that a strict application
of the creditors' harm heuristic may persuade a court to disregard value
paid by a transferee initially to third parties. Nonetheless, courts are ac-
knowledging that "indirect benefits" can possibly satisfy the reasonably
equivalent value requirement if the value is definite and not illusory.57
This is correct for the obvious reason-"indirect benefits" are indeed ben-
efits to the debtor and ultimately its creditors, by definition. Although
these indirect benefits may not, and often do not, constitute reasonably
equivalent value, there is no reason that they should not be quantified and
considered.
To understand that the essence of fraudulent transfer law is to pro-
tect creditors from the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate requires
one to accept a fundamentally sound, yet deceptively simple fact of life.
Ultimately, fraudulent transfer law is but a debt-collection device. It was
never intended to be anything but a debt-collection device. Collectively,
creditors are entitled to a fair distribution of the estate when their debtor
is insolvent.5" Juxtaposed to this basic principle is the notion that a gen-
eral creditor acquires no specific interest in his debtor's property until he
gains, by process of law, the right to realize his debt through judgment
and then execution.59 Furthermore, a debtor does not hold its estate in
trust for its general creditors.
With these basic principles in mind, one can see the essence of the
harm caused by a fraudulent transfer: "[T]he fraudulent transfer infringes
the creditors' collective right to a fair distribution of their debtor's estate,
just as it infringes the single creditor's right to collect through judgment
and attachment."6" To distill this grand notion, one can conclude that the
crux of fraudulent transfer law was, and should be, to protect creditors
from "the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate."''6 Putting aside what
re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 Bankr. 920, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (court's focus is on what
debtor receives in exchange for asset surrendered, irrespective of third-party gain or loss); see also
Cieri, Heiman, Henze, Jenks, Kirschner, Riley & Sullivan, An Introduction to Legal and Practical
Considerations in the Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAw. 333, 355-56
(1989) [hereinafter Cieri, Heiman]. See generally 1A BANKR. Ss.Rv. L. ED. § 5D:2, at 9 (1990).
"' See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d 725, 727 (11th Cir.
1990); Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Cieri,
Heiman, supra note 46, at 355 & nn.98-100; Sherwin, supra note 5, at 474 n.96 (cases cited therein).
" 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 44, at 72.
59 Id. § 13, at 17.
"o Id. § 45, at 73. Professor Glenn stated that this proposition is so self evident that it needs no
exposition. Id.
6 Id. § 195, at 348; see Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi Fin. Corp.), 119 Bankr. 106
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); accord Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d
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this concept means for the time being, one should first determine what it
does not mean. As previously mentioned, this concept does not mean that
a debtor holds his estate in trust for his creditors. Moreover, the concept
applies to the estate at large and not to a particular asset as a component
of the estate.
The creditor's right to realize upon the debtor's property, conferred by
judgment, put into effect by execution, supplemented by judgment creditor's
bill and various substitutes for that remedy-is not a roving right. All he
can ask is that he find assets, no matter of what sort, sufficient to raise the
amount of the judgment debt with interest and cost. But he may not de-
mand that any particular asset be kept on hand. In the absence of lien,
mortgage, or trust express or constructive, the creditor cannot insist upon
seeing tomorrow what he sees today as part of his debtor's estate. His right
is that the estate, at the time when attachment is to issue or levy be made,
shall not have been so depleted that he cannot be paid."
Consequently, no injury can result from the sale of an asset at its fair
value. "The reason is . . . the estate [does not] abate as a result of what
was done. In the case of a fair sale, the creditor simply finds new value
replacing old.""3
Fraudulent transfer law recognizes that the creditor cannot complain
of any transaction that leaves the debtor solvent. Additionally, fraudulent
transfer law does not allow a creditor to complain of any transaction
where the debtor receives reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
property transferred. Both of these are components of the heuristic offered
here-a fraudulent transfer can be successfully attacked only if the
debtor's estate was unfairly diminished. Moreover, fraudulent transfer
law requires that these assessments be made at the time of the transfer. A
subsequent failure of reasonably equivalent value, unforeseen by the par-
ties at the time of the transfer, should have no invalidating effect.6" In
other words, what went out of the estate must be roughly equivalent to
what replaced it. From a creditors' harm perspective, the transfer for
equivalent value is nothing more than, to use Professor Glenn's words, a
206 (3d Cir. 1990); Running v. Widdes, 52 Wis.2d 254, 190 N.W.2d 169 (1971); Kunmet v.
Thielen, 210 Minn. 302, 298 N.W. 245 (1941); Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wash. App. 864, 515 P.2d 995
(1973).
:2 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 196, at 349.
' Id. § 199, at 351.




With this backdrop in mind, one can easily understand why, at least
superficially, courts have been zealous (some would say fanatic) in con-
demning the three-party or indirect benefit transaction. When a debtor
extends money in exchange for benefits conferred upon a third person, it
should be asked whether the debtor's relations with the third person are
such, by way of contract or property interest, that the transaction will
increase the estate of the debtor rather than diminish it, or at least leave
the debtor's estate substantially as it was. "Paying out money to enlarge a
worthless husband from durance vile, is quite different from a transaction
which benefits directly a third party corporation indeed-but a corpora-
tion whose shares are owned by the debtor."66 One can also understand
the zealousness of courts in addressing leveraged transactions. In its sim-
plest terms, a leveraged buyout reduces the assets available to unsecured
creditors by replacing old equity with new secured debt. Thus, old equity
is able to elevate its position in the state priority pecking order at the
expense of the general creditors.67 Consequently, when one speaks of the
debtor's estate, one means the estate available to his creditors.68
The article now turns to examples that are intended to support the
heuristic. One age-old problem was whether the assignment for benefit of
creditors was itself a fraudulent transfer.69 At common law, the assign-
ment was an express trust that the debtor created by conveyance of his
assets to the assignee for the purpose of liquidating the estate assets and
distributing their value among the debtor's creditors.70 Fraudulent trans-
fer law did not view the general assignment for the benefit of creditors as
a fraudulent transfer.7 ' Why? There was no unjust diminution of the es-
tate; for, in reality, there was no diminution of the estate in the first in-
stance. The assets remained for the purpose of satisfying the creditors'
claims.
A second example also helps to show the efficacy of the creditor's
harm heuristic. Assume that the debtor transferred a beautiful painting by
Rembrandt. Also, assume that a general creditor had a distinct fondness
for Rembrandts. This creditor did not have a lien on the painting; never-
65 Id. § 275, at 472.
66 Id. § 276, at 474.
'1 See Sherwin, supra note 5, at 451-52.
61 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 276, at 473.





theless, he dreamed one day of owning the Rembrandt. Imagine the shock
of the creditor when he finds out that his debtor has transferred the Rem-
brandt for a mere $50.00. Can that creditor avoid the transfer and bring
the painting back into the debtor's estate? It depends.
[Because] . . . courts will never act unless they have to, a creditor cannot
raise the issue of fraudulent conveyance unless he needs the missing asset in
order to satisfy his claim. If at present a debtor has assets that are sufficient
to meet his debts, it is academic that previously he had made a fraudulent
conveyance. Hence the well-settled rule that if a debtor had regained sol-
vency, to his creditor's knowledge, prior to a suit to set aside the earlier
transfer, the creditor will be dismissed.72
Another example involves a situation where a debtor donates his ser-
vices to a charitable organization. A debtor's services are not an asset that
his creditors can use to satisfy their claims; therefore, the donation of those
services to a charitable organization, even when the debtor is insolvent,
does not generate fraudulent transfer liability, even where the value of the
beneficiary's estate is substantially enhanced .7 But, of course, this is not
the result where the debtor provides services to a beneficiary who, in turn,
pays a designated third party for the services rendered. Although the
debtor's labor itself is not an asset upon which the debtor's creditor can
realize, the fruits of that labor-the remuneration-is."'
Professor Glenn provides a further example of an unjust diminution
of the debtor's estate.
In the field of mining law, it is possible for a prospector to lose all right by
sheer delay, against a man who has 'jumped' his claim. The creditors of this
faineant, however, may have the adverse party's title set aside, as having
been acquired by way of fraudulent conveyance, if they can show that their
debtor allowed these rights to be gained, by conical, in order to keep them
out of the estate that would otherwise be available for creditors."
Again, what the examples should show is that a transfer must be
scrutinized to determine whether it unjustly diminishes the debtor's estate.
I have used the shorthand label of a "reasoned creditors' harm" to demon-
72 Id. § 111, at 220-21.
73 Id. § 212, at 365.
7, See id. § 213, at 365.
75 Id. § 214, at 366.
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strate the legitimacy and applicability of the heuristic. Nonetheless, the
heuristic focuses not only on whether harm has come to the creditors, but
also on whether the harm is unjust. It is this latter inquiry that truly
defines the limits of fraudulent transfer law. Of course, one must keep at
hand the fact that in assessing the unjust diminution of the estate, lack of
diminution in the first instance is its own limitation. Consequently, a
transfer by an insolvent debtor for less than reasonably equivalent value is
a first-order limitation embodied in the concept of the unjust diminution
of the debtor's estate. 71 Professor Smyser has convincingly reminded us of
that basic precept.77 The remainder of this article will turn to an exami-
nation of the remaining orders of limitation embodied in the concepts of
transfer, affirmative defenses, and remedies under fraudulent transfer
laws. It is this mesh of these limitations that properly define, like the
lighthouses of old, the coastline of modern fraudulent transfer law.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
To make out a successful Section 548(a)(2) claim, the trustee must
prove (1) a transfer to the defendant of (2) an interest in property of the
debtor78 (3) during the year preceding the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy7 19 (4) without reasonably equivalent value 0 in exchange for such
74 Along with these requirements, the remaining elements of a § 548 or § 544 action are first-
order limitations. For example, if the challenged transfer is one not conveying property of the debtor,
then the transfer will not deprive the estate of something that could be used to satisfy creditors. See
Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N.A.), 836 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988). Thus, it should come to no one's surprise that a transfer of exempt property is not
generally actionable under the UFTA because there is no diminution in the debtor's estate. See, e.g.,
Sisco v. Paulson, 232 Minn. 250, 45 N.W.2d 385 (1950). The same, unfortunately, does not hold true
for actions under § 548. Because exempt property is property of the estate under § 541, a transfer of
exempt property may be challenged even where there may be no unjust diminution of the estate from
a state law perspective. Nevertheless, the action and subsequent recovery of the fraudulently trans-
ferred assets or the value of the assets must be for the benefit of the creditors. See NCNB Nat'l Bank
v. Fogarty (In re Fogarty), 114 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (debtors are precluded from
avoiding a transfer where, under their reorganization plan, the debtors and not the creditors would
benefit from the debtors' recovery of the avoided property).
" See Smyser, supra note 7, at 791.
7' The Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase "interest of the debtor in property." Al-
though the question of what constitutes an interest of the debtor in property is a question of federal
law, the courts will consult state law in determining whether this element is met. 1A BANKR. SERV.
L. ED. § 5D:12, at 19 & n.1 (1990) (cases cited therein). The property requirement enjoys a broad
scope and is generally construed in light of the purposes of fraudulent transfer law. Generally, the
transfer must have depleted the debtor's estate. Id. § 5D:12, at 19-20 & n.2 (cases cited therein).
71 It is the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and not any subsequent petition that is used as the
timing reference under § 548. See Bluford v. First Fidelity Mortgage Co. (In re Bluford), 40 Bankr.
640, 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984). The appropriate reach-back period is often one of the most hotly
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transfer (5) while the debtor was insolvent.8 '
A. The "Transfer"
Transfer is broadly defined in Section 101(50) of the Bankruptcy
Code to include "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest
and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption."8" A transfer is pro-
tean and embracive,83 including a gift,84 a nonjudicial foreclosure sale,88 a
contested issues in a fraudulent transfer action. Section 548(a) constitutes a grant of power to the
trustee to avoid certain transfers deemed to have been made within one year of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. The reach-back period is not a statute of limitations. The reach-back require-
ment cannot be waived; it is not an affirmative defense. It serves as a means by which the trustee's
power is limited in time so that § 548 does not serve as a form of unlimited insurance for creditors
against the debtor's striking a bad deal. Consequently, transfers "deemed" to have taken place outside
the one-year period are not subject to attack under § 548. However, one must be careful not to be
misled by the realities of the transactions. Section 548(d)(1) states a policy and is not a recantation of
the actual events. Thus, the law on when a transaction is deemed to have occurred (as opposed to
when, in reality, it happened) must be consulted. Finally, all transfers within the applicable time
period must be examined by the court.
$0 The phrase was "fair consideration" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and incorporated a
requirement of good faith that no longer exists under § 548(a)(2) or §§ 4 and 5 of the UFTA. See
Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653, 656 (D. Conn. 1983); see also UFCA § 3, 7A U.L.A.
427, 448-49 (1918) (employing a "fair consideration" standard).
s Murphy v. General Elec. Credit Corp. (In re Rodriguez), 77 Bankr. 939, 940 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1987), affd, 895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986). The corresponding UFTA sections are §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 639, 652-53, 657 (1984). Although
obvious, it is occasionally overlooked that postpetition (as opposed to prepetition) transfers are not
voidable under § 548. Nemeti v. Seaway Nat'l Bank (In re Nemeti), 65 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1986).
:2 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
8 See Venice Western Motel, Ltd. v. Venice Motor Inn, Ltd. (In re Venice Western Motel,
Ltd.), 67 Bankr. 777, 780 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
s, Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15, 17 (10th Cir. 1972).
s Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (seminal case hold-
ing that a foreclosure sale is a transfer); accord First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm),
738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). But cf Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); In re
Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1985).
Does the Durrett analysis apply to the personal property context? For example, if a debtor
grants a security interest in all of its assets, there is little trouble finding a transfer once the interest is
perfected. But if the debtor defaults, is the creditor's repossession and subsequent sale of the assets a
new transfer? One bankruptcy court held that a pledge of securities as collateral and the subsequent
involuntary sale of those securities upon the debtor's default each constituted separate transfers.
Calairo v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 33 Bankr. 288, 291-92 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983),
rev'd, 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 746 F.2d 1465 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985). The court reasoned that the UCC sale must be a transfer, at least where the debtor's interest
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filing of a lis pendens for alimony,86 an execution on a judgment lien,87 a
renewal of a loan and payments thereunder,88 a pledge of securities and
subsequent involuntary sale,89 a termination of a lease,9" a settlement
in the collateral exceeded the bank's secured debt. Id.
Calairo was subsequently reversed by the district court. 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The
district court held that the only transfer was the original pledge of the collateral and not the subse-
quent sale, failing to discuss the new 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 478. The
district court was later affirmed by the Third Circuit in a summary disposition. 746 F.2d 1465, 1465
(3d Cir. 1984); see UFTA § 8(e)(2), 7A U.L.A. 639, 662 (1984) (a transfer is not voidable if the
transfer results from enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code).
It seems that the Durrett analysis and the Calairo analysis cannot live side-by-side. A little
background may be helpful. In Durrett, the Fifth Circuit addressed a foreclosure sale, pursuant to a
power of sale in a deed of trust, under Texas law. In Texas, the debtor's right of redemption of the
real property ceases when the property is struck at the courthouse steps. Furthermore, only the debtor
and any guarantors or co-owners have a right to notice of the foreclosure sale. In other words, junior
lienholders, even those who have perfected their liens in the county's real property records, are not
entitled to notice of the foreclosure sale that will, under Texas law, extinguish their perfected lien.
Thus, only where notifying a junior lienholder of the proposed foreclosure sale would be beneficial to
the senior lienholder-where, for example, the senior believes the junior will purchase its debt and
take it out of its credit relationship with the debtor-will the junior receive notice. Nonetheless, the
usual practice is not to provide notice to junior lienholders. This result almost always amazes those
practitioners from other jurisdictions who forcefully argue that such a foreclosure scheme violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To them I used to quote at length the Texas cases
finding no state action, to which we would often get into long esoteric discussions about the state
action doctrine. Always, they found my defense of the Texas system unconvincing for obvious reasons.
Lately, I tell my fellow practitioners that "[iln Texas, however, people do things their own way."
Nickles, The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations, 74 MINN. L. REv. 371, 378 (1990). Al-
though not sound legal analysis, the answer does have the attribute of foreclosing debate on the state
action doctrine.
It was in this context that the Fifth Circuit addressed the issues in Durrett. I cannot help but
believe that the system itself poisoned the court's analysis of the transfer and the reasonably equivalent
value requirements. Furthermore, I cannot help but believe that the Durrett analysis, if good law,
should apply to the Article 9 foreclosure sale as well. After all, the Article 9 foreclosure sale extin-
guishes the debtor's right of redemption in the same manner as the real property foreclosure under
Texas law, an act that appears to be a transfer by the debtor under § 101(50). Certainly, there are
more provisions in Article 9 to ensure a commercially reasonable disposition, see U.C.C. § 9-504, but
these provisions go to the question of value and not whether the triggering transfer exists.
88 In re Ottaviano, 63 Bankr. 338, 341 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
87 Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 167-69 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
88 B.Z. Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A. (In re B.Z. Corp.), 34 Bankr. 546, 548 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983).
88 Kelley v. Homer (In re Kelley), 7 Bankr. 384, 388-89 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980).
Eder v. Queen City Grain, Inc. (In re Queen City Grain, Inc.), 51 Bankr. 722, 725-26
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); see also Darby v. Atlinson (In re Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33, 39 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (lease cancellation because of default is transfer subject to fraudulent transfer analysis).
But see UFTA § 8(e)(1), 7A U.L.A. 639, 662 (1984) (leases terminated pursuant to their terms
excluded from fraudulent transfer liability).
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agreement, 9' a consignment of goods,92 a bonus,93 a planting of crops, 4 a
bank's forebearance in collection of indebtedness in exchange for a secur-
ity interest in livestock, 5 a garnishment of the debtor's bank account,9" an
attachment of a judgment lien,97 a leveraged buyout,98 an upstream,
downstream, or cross-stream guaranty,99 a ratification of security inter-
ests, 0 0 a draw on a credit line,10 ' a collusive judgment,0'2 an encum-
brance,' 03 a release by a beneficiary of an interest in a trust estate,10 4 a
change in a beneficiary of a life insurance policy,0 5 a divorce or separa-
tion agreement,' 06 a rescission of a profitable contract, 0 7 a payment of a
dividend,' and a payment of usurious interest.'0 9 This list does not at-
tempt to exhaust all of the possibilities of the term "transfer."' 10
" In re Edward Harvey Co., 68 Bankr. 851, 858 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
Campbell v. Macartie (In re Factory Tire Distribs., Inc.), 64 Bankr. 335, 338 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1986).
"2 Id. at 339.
'4 Lemley-Cabbiness Farms v. FDIC (In re Lemley Estate Business Trust), 65 Bankr. 185, 189
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
" In re Bob Schwermer & Assocs., Inc., 27 Bankr. 304, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1983).
Ellenberg v. DeKalb County, Ga. (In re Maytag Sales and Serv., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 384, 388
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (case under § 547(b)).
01 Suppa v. Capalbo (In re Suppa), 8 Bankr. 720, 722 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (case under §
547(b)).
" Kupetz v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754, 759-60 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); see United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). See generally Carl-
son, supra note 5, at 73.
" Lawrence Paperboard Corp. v. Arlington Trust Co. (In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp.), 76
Bankr. 866, 874-76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). See generally Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for
the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. Ras. 433 (1980); Rosen-
berg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U.
PA. L. REv. 235 (1976).
100 Mitchell v. Travis (In re Jackson Sound Studios, Inc.), 473 F.2d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 1973).
101 Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 989-91 (2d Cir. 1981).
'°s Petrides v. Park Hill Restaurant, Inc., 265 A.D. 509, 511, 39 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (1943).
10, Service Mortgage Corp. v. Welson, 293 Mass. 410, 412, 200 N.E. 278, 279 (1936).
:04 Schaefer v. Fisher, 137 Misc. 420, 426, 242 N.Y.S. 308, 314 (1930).
105 Id.
10 FDIC v. Malin, 802 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1986).
10 Wilson v. Holub, 202 Iowa 549, 552, 210 N.W. 593, 595 (1926).
100 Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi Fin. Corp.), 119 Bankr. 106, 109 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990).
I" Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 607, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (1963).
... Because what constitutes a transfer is a question of federal law, state law on the issue is not
controlling. See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1945); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Huhm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Lovett
v. Shuster, 633 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1980). For purposes of § 548, "transfer" should be construed to
include an obligation incurred. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(50), 548(a) (1988); see also 1A BANKR. SFRV.
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The time when a transfer is deemed made for purposes of fraudulent
transfer actions depends on Section 548(d)(1) and applicable state law.
Section 548(d)(1) states:
For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer is so
perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom applica-
ble law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in
the property transferred that is superior to the interest in such property of
the transferee, but if such transfer is not so perfected before the commence-
ment of the case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of the
filing of the petition.""
Thus, a fraudulent transfer is deemed to have occurred under Section
548(d)(1) when the transfer becomes valid against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser pursuant to applicable state law." 2 If the transfer is not per-
fected against a bona fide purchaser before the filing of the petition, the
transfer is deemed to have occurred immediately before the date of the
filing."' The purpose of Section 548(d)(1) is two-fold: first, the time of
perfection serves as an objective point in computing the reach-back period
of the trustee; and, second, it discourages secret, that is, unperfected
liens." 4
One finds the second-order limitation of fraudulent transfer law in-
herent in the chameleon-like quality of a "transfer." In a two-party trans-
action, the transfer is obvious. A transfers its property worth $100 to B,
who in exchange pays A $25. The transfer is A's parting with property in
exchange for substantially lower value.
However, the concept of "transfer" when more than two parties are
L. ED. § 5D:6, at 13-14 (1990) ("a 'transfer' should be construed as including the incurring of an
obligation").
1 1 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1988).
112 See Sandoz v. Bennett (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 807 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1987); Ma-
drid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 833 (1984); Lovett, 633 F.2d at 104; Furedy v. Appleman (In re Vodco Volume Dev. Co.), 567
F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 806 (1978); Main v. Brim (In re Main), 75
Bankr. 322, 326 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987); Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 171 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1984); Schatzman v. Campo (In re Oesterle), 2 Bankr. 122, 124 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1979).
118 See Oesterle, 2 Bankr. at 124 (actual "transfer" made well before one year of the filing of the
petition but recorded two days after the filing; held, transfer deemed to have occurred immediately
before filing); see also Cook, supra note 20, at 269-70 (rule facilitates trustee's burden of proof on
insolvency because it is highly likely that the debtor was insolvent immediately before bankruptcy).
114 In re Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1200; Nemeti v. Seaway Nat'l Bank (In re Nemeti), 65 Bankr.
391, 395 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986); see 4 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 548.08, at 548-87 to -88 (15th
ed. 1990).
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involved can be problematic. Take for example the typical leveraged
buyout structure. The acquirer typically forms a minimally capitalized
shell corporation. The lender loans money directly to the shell corpora-
tion, which uses the proceeds of the loan to cash out the shareholders of
the target corporation. Subsequently, the acquirer merges the target and
the shell corporation, the target assuming the responsibility of the shell's
debt. At the same time, the unencumbered assets of the target are pledged
as collateral to secure the original acquiring loan. In this simple leveraged
buyout, a number of parties are involved."1 5 To the untrained eye, there
also appears to be more than one transfer. How does a court, when scruti-
nizing this transaction, determine which transfer or transfers to measure
against the fraudulent transfer benchmark? One approach is to collapse
all the transfers into one "transfer" for purposes of fraudulent transfer
analysis. Another approach is to dissect the transaction into a number of
transfers, scrutinizing each specific transfer under fraudulent transfer law.
The answer to this perplexing question provides the second order limita-
tion to the application of fraudulent transfer law.
Although the case law in this area is still evolving, one can glean
certain principles that courts consider important in determining what is
the appropriate transfer for fraudulent transfer analysis. The answer ap-
pears to rest on a court's evaluation of the intent of the parties, the knowl-
edge of the parties, and the notice provided to the parties at the time of
the transfer. For example, in the leveraged buyout discussed above, if the
lender were aware or should have been aware that the funds were to be
used by the acquirer to pay off the shareholders of the target corporation,
then a court will readily collapse the various transfers into one for pur-
poses of assessing fraudulent transfer liability. 6 Nevertheless, if a court
were to conclude that the lender did not know and that a reasonably pru-
dent lender would not have known of the diversion of funds from creditors
of the target corporation to the shareholders of the corporation, then the
transfer should be viewed from the eyes of the reasonably prudent lender
for purposes of assessing fraudulent transfer liability. This approach,
however, may lead to an anomalous result. In any given transaction, a
transfer may be defined differently, depending on whose eyes the court
employs. Nonetheless, the evolving body of case law in this area does sup-
"' For a more complete discussion of various forms of leveraged buyouts, see Carlson, supra
note 5, at 80-83.
See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302-03 & n.8 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
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port this outcome.
In Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein,"7 the court denied a mo-
tion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, ruling that the various transactions that made up the leveraged
buyout in that case should be viewed as a single transaction. " 8 The court
based this conclusion on the facts that the parties were aware of the na-
ture of the leveraged buyout and had been counseled regarding the possi-
ble consequences of any leveraged buyout under fraudulent transfer
laws." 9 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint with respect to
those shareholders who were not controlling or insider shareholders. 20
According to the court, the debtor did not allege that these shareholders
were aware that the acquisition encumbered all of the debtor's assets or
that the property they received for the tender of their shares was the
debtor's property rather than the property of the buyer.' 2 ' The sharehold-
ers were aware only that a public tender offer had been made for the
shares of the debtor's stock.' In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
on United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.' and Kupetz v. Wolf 24
for the basic proposition that a court should focus not on the formal struc-
ture of the transaction but rather on the knowledge or intent of the parties
in assessing fraudulent transfer liability. 25
The following summarizes the facts in Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schot-
tenstein.2 68 Wieboldt Stores, Inc. ("WSI") was a well-known retailer in
the Chicago area, owning and operating twelve stores. No longer able to
meet its obligations as they came due, Wieboldt's board approved a tender
offer by WSI Acquisition. Subsequently, WSI acquired 99% of the
debtor's stock for over $38.4 million. To finance the purchase, it was nec-
essary to sell the debtor's flagship State Street store in order to pay off an
existing loan secured by the debtor's real estate assets. The property was
then mortgaged to a lender. Each of the lenders, those providing the prin-
cipal financing of the tender offer, the mortgagee, and the accounts lender,
were aware of the others' commitments and of WSI's tender offer. During
17 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
113 Id. at 500-02.
119 Id. at 502.
120 Id. at 503.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 503-04.
122 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
124 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
125 Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 94 Bankr. at 500-02.
116 See id. at 493-97.
[Vol. 8
1991] Fraudulent Transfer Law
the negotiations, the principal lender indicated that it would require a
statement of the debtor's solvency from a nationally recognized accounting
firm. The lender was informed, however, that the debtor would only con-
tinue to cooperate with the leveraged buyout if the lender dropped its de-
mand. Consequently, no solvency certificate was ever produced.
After the tender offer, the principal lender's loan was secured by as-
sets freed from prior obligations by loans from the other lenders. The
debtor became liable to the lender for $32.5 million. Although the debtor's
board initially believed that the tender offer would produce $10 million in
working capital, they later realized this would not occur. In fact, the
debtor did not receive any working capital as a result of the transaction.
Less than a year later, the debtor was in bankruptcy, and a fraudu-
lent transfer action, subsequently, was filed. The action named 119 de-
fendants, grouped into three categories: controlling shareholders, officers
and directors; other shareholders who tendered more than 1,000 shares of
stock; and lenders.
After quickly resolving that fraudulent transfer laws did apply to
leveraged buyouts, the court confronted the issue of how to view the trans-
action. " ' A number of defendants argued that the tender offer and the
leveraged buyout were composed of a series of interrelated but indepen-
dent transactions. In the case of the principal lender, for example, these
defendants maintained that the pledge of the debtor's assets was a transac-
tion separate from the funding of the loan. Hence, the defendants argued
that they received WSI property in exchange for those shares, not the
debtor's property. The debtor, however, urged the court to collapse the
interrelated transactions into one aggregate transaction. This approach,
the court observed, required a determination that the defendants receiving
the transfers were direct transferees who received an interest of the debtor
and that WSI and any others were mere conduits of the debtor's
property.128
Carefully reviewing the rulings in Kupetz and Tabor Court Realty,
the court observed that both the Ninth and Third Circuits focused on the
parties' knowledge of the transactions and their intent in determining the
proper anatomy of the transfer. 29 In Kupetz, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that there was no fraudulent transfer because
the shareholders did not sell their shares to defraud creditors, and they did
117 Id. at 500.
12 Id. at 503.
129 Id. at 500-02.
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not know that the buyer was engaged in a leveraged buyout.'30 In Tabor
Court Realty, however, the Third Circuit held a lender liable because it
knew of the buyer's intended use of the loan proceeds.'' The lender real-
ized that the loan would deplete the debtor's assets to the point that the
debtor, would be functionally insolvent. Moreover, it upheld the district
court's decision to integrate the series of transactions between the lender,
the buyer, and the sellers.'
Similarly, in Wieboldt, the court determined that the board and the
insider shareholders knew that WSI intended to finance its acquisition
through a leveraged buyout, rather than with its own funds.13 They
knew that the debtor was insolvent before the leveraged buyout and that
the leveraged buyout would further encumber the debtor's assets."' The
court also found that attorneys advised the former Wieboldt board of
fraudulent transfer laws and suggested that the leveraged buyout be struc-
tured to avoid liability.3 5 Given the knowledge of the parties and the
structuring of the leveraged buyout, the court concluded that the transac-
tions should be collapsed into one transaction with respect to the directors,
the insider shareholders, the controlling shareholders, and the lenders. " 6
The court, however, was not willing to collapse the transactions with
respect to the non-insider or non-controlling shareholders. "' The debtor
did not allege that these shareholders were aware that the acquisition en-
cumbered virtually all of the debtor's assets or that they received the
debtor's property in exchange for their shares.'3 8 In fact, the court found
that the shareholders knew only that WSI had made a tender offer for
shares of the debtor's stock.'" 9
The court's determination of the appropriate transfer had the effect
of shielding the non-insider and non-controlling shareholders from fraud-
ulent transfer liability. Under Section 550(b), a trustee cannot recover
fraudulently conveyed property from a subsequent transferee who takes
the property in good faith for value and without knowledge that the origi-
M Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1988).
1 United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1296 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
1 2 803 F.2d at 1302-03 & n.8.
": Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 94 Bankr. at 502.
134 Id. at 502.
15 Id.
136 Id.
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nal transfer was voidable.1 4 Based on the court's limitation of the term
"transfer," from the perspective of the non-insider, non-controlling share-
holders, "WSI was the direct transferee of [the debtor's] property, and the
shareholders were merely indirect transferees because WSI was viewed as
an independent entity in the transaction."1 1
Thus, one can discern from Wieboldt, Kupetz, and Tabor Court Re-
alty, a clear second-order limitation. Although the term "transfer" under
Section 101(50) is broadly defined and all encompassing, it does appear to
have inherent limitations in application. In determining the transfer,
courts will scrutinize the intent and knowledge of the parties. Conse-
quently, the anatomy of the transfer as seen through the eyes of a particu-
lar target defendant provides a second-order limitation to the applicability
of fraudulent transfer law to modern transactions.1 42
B. Failure of Reasonably Equivalent Value
Receiving less than reasonably equivalent value for a transfer made
or obligation incurred is one of the necessary elements of a constructive
fraudulent transfer.'4" Consequently, as previously discussed, 44 this re-
quirement is also a component of the first-order limitations to fraudulent
transfer law. The assessment of reasonably equivalent value is objective
and is generally a question of fact.145 Courts have generally employed a
14 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
:41 Id. at 503-04.
141 Moreover, certain types of transfers are categorically excluded from the application of fraud-
ulent transfer laws. These exclusions are also second-order limitations. Under the Code, margin and
settlement payments, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 741(5), (8), 761(15) (1988), made by or to a commodity bro-
ker, see § 101(5), forward contract merchant, see § 101(25), stockbroker, see § 101(48), financial
institution, see § 101(21), or securities clearing agency, see § 101(42), before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition cannot be avoided except on the basis of actual fraud. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(e),
548(a)(1) (1988); see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 850 (10th Cir.
1990) (consumation of a leveraged buyout held to be a settlement payment exempted from avoidance).
Additionally, margin or settlement payments made by or to a repo participant, see § 101(40), in
connection with a repurchase agreement, see § 101(41), cannot be avoided except on the basis of
actual fraud. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(0, 548(a)(1) (1988).
Under the UFTA, a number of specific transfers are excluded from fraudulent transfer liability.
Examples of these transfers include regularly conducted, noncollusive real estate foreclosure sales, see
UFTA § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 650 (1984), regularly conducted Article 9 personal property foreclo-
sure sales, see UFTA § 8(e)(2), 7A U.L.A. at 662, and leases terminated pursuant to their terms, see
UFTA § 8(e)(1), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
.. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
14, See Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979); Jacoway v. Anderson Cajun's
Wharf (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 74 Bankr. 139, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.), remanded, 77
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case-by-case approach in assessing reasonably equivalent value while ob-
serving the unfairness of applying mechanical tests.146
Reasonably equivalent value is not susceptible to simple formulation.
Ideally, it should signify the reasonable estimate of what can be realized
from the debtor's assets by converting them into cash under possibly
guarded (but not forced-sale) conditions. The focus is on the consideration
received by the debtor, not on the value given by the transferee.147 The
purpose of fraudulent transfer law is the preservation of the debtor's es-
tate for the benefit of its unsecured creditors.148 Consequently, what con-
stitutes reasonably equivalent value must be determined from the stand-
point of the debtor's creditors-a view consistent with my working
hypothesis.14 9 In addition, courts have shown little regard for considera-
tion which is conjectural or indeterminate.1 50 Intangible benefits, such as
new or more motivated management, rarely constitute reasonably
equivalent value.' 1
"Value" is defined as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a pre-
sent or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed
promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor."''
Under the Code, the proper valuation of an asset for purposes of assessing
reasonably equivalent value appears to be that "amount which can be re-
alized from the assets within a reasonable time" and not upon immediate
liquidation. 5 In addition, where the assets have a greater value as an
ongoing business, that value is usually determinative.1 54
Bankr. 686 (W.D. Ark.), on remand, 83 Bankr. 591 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 850 Bankr. 342 (8th Cir. 1988). But see Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621
F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980) (question of law in mortgage foreclosure context).
"" See, e.g., Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 115 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 994 (2d Cir.
1981) (rejecting any requirement of "mathematical precision" in determining reasonably equivalent
value). But see Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203 (observing that a foreclosure bid price of less than 70% of
fair market value would not constitute reasonably equivalent value).
141 See Ohio Corrugating Corp. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating
Corp.), 70 Bankr. 920, 926-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
148 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc. (In re Minnesota Utility
Contracting, Inc.), 110 Bankr. 414, 420 (D. Minn. 1990).
149 See Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi Fin. Corp.), 119 Bankr. 106, 109 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990); Bowery v. Vines, 178 Tenn. 98, 102, 156 S.W.2d 395, 397 (1941).
250 See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
11 See id. at 182.
2 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1988).
15 See, e.g., Utility Stationery Stores, Inc. v. American Portfolio (In re Utility Stationery Stores,
Inc.), 12 Bankr. 170, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (§ 547(b) action).
'" Danning v. Progressive Pharmaceutical Sys., Inc. (In re Western Adams Hosp. Corp.), 609
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Although it is clear that payment on an antecedent debt constitutes
value, the payment is not dispositive of the issue of reasonably equivalent
value.' 55 Rather, the debt must be legitimate and bona fide; moreover, the
debt must be compared to the value transferred by the debtor to see if
reasonably equivalent value is lacking.' 56 Unlike the UFTA or the Code,
the Texas UFTA57 does provide a noninclusive definition of reasonably
equivalent value. Under Texas UFTA Section 24.004(d), reasonably
equivalent value includes, without limitation, a "transfer or obligation
that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have
willfully sold the assets in an [arm's] length transaction.' 5 ' This is con-
sistent with the decision in Anderson Industries, Inc. v. Anderson (In re
Anderson Industries, Inc. ),151 which analyzed reasonably equivalent
value in light of the fact that the bargained for exchange was reached
through arm's length negotiations where, presumably, the purchaser was
the most informed party as to the value of the asset. 6
The crux of reasonably equivalent value is whether the value trans-
ferred is disproportionately small compared to the value actually received
by the debtor. 6 ' The bargaining position of the parties, their relationship,
the adequacy of the price, the prevailing market conditions, and the mar-
ketability of the property transferred are all relevant considerations." 2
F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
I" Demusis v. Carr (In re Carr), 40 Bankr. 1007, 1008 (D. Conn. 1984). For a discussion of
different categories of value, see IA BANKR. Sa.Rv. L. ED. §§ 5D:34 to :44, at 36-41 (1990).
Is# See Plymouth United Say. Bank v. Lee, 278 Mich. 545, 548, 270 N.W. 781, 782 (1936).
How about the situation where a debtor who has borrowed $1 million grants a security interest to its
creditor in all of its assets worth $5 million-is the perfection of the security interest a fraudulent
transfer? I believe common sense would lead one to conclude no. Regardless of the breadth of the
security interest, the creditor is only entitled to satisfaction of the debt. In other words, although $5
million in assets are encumbered, it is only to the extent of the $1 million indebtedness. The UFTA
follows this common sense approach. See UFTA, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 639, 641 (1984). This,
however, may not be the case under the UFCA. Bad faith coupled with property securing a present
advance or antecedent debt in an amount disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property may lead a court to find a lack of fair consideration. UFCA § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 427, 449
(1918).
1 Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(d) (Vernon 1987).
15 Id.; see Kjeldahl v. United States (In re Kjeldahl), 52 Bankr. 926, 934 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985) (reasonably equivalent value is the amount which reasonable minds would agree is a close or
fair exchange given all the circumstances surrounding the transfer).
'6* 55 Bankr. 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985).
160 Id. at 927-28.
1' See IA BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 5D:45, at 42 (1990).
1" See Cook, supra note 20, at 278; see also Jacoway v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant
Equip. Co.), 850 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1988) (analysis of reasonably equivalent value in fraudulent
transfer context requires consideration of "the entire situation" including market conditions).
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Unfortunately, the case law on reasonably equivalent value is hope-
lessly confused. Aside from several general rules regarding reasonably
equivalent value discussed above, each court seems to address the issue in
a subjective and almost personal manner. For example, one court, re-
signed to the fact that no true market comparison could be made to deter-
mine reasonably equivalent value because no such market existed, never-
theless created a hypothetical market to gauge the price paid by the
transferee. 63 All in all, the cases on reasonably equivalent value have
been deficient in providing a sensible and predictable manner to judge
whether a debtor has transferred an asset for less than reasonably
equivalent value.
A more functional approach to the endeavor should be embraced. A
functional approach should be easier to apply and more predictable in its
outcome. It will not change the existing fraudulent transfer policies;
rather, a functional approach should help ensure that they are better un-
derstood and more consistently applied.' This approach subtly shifts the
focus from the value received to the context or disposition of that value,
not unlike Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which focuses
on the circumstances surrounding the disposition of the collateral in gaug-
ing commercial reasonableness." 5 Section 9-507 states that inadequacy of
price alone should not lead a court to conclude that the Article 9 disposi-
tion was not commercially reasonable.' 66 Why? I believe that this admoni-
113 See Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 75
Bankr. 619, 622-25 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990).
16 See generally Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV.
227 (1990) (lauding the functional approach to bankruptcy issues).
165 See U.C.C. § 9-504(3). Section 9-504(3) provides:
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels
and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including
the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collat-
eral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold
on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposi-
tion is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after
default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of
consumer goods no other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent
to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending his
notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of
a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is
the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
Id.
166 U.C.C. § 9-507(2). Section 9-507(2) provides:
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tion is necessary because courts, like people, fall victim to the lure of hind-
sight. This was clearly the trap sprung by the bankruptcy judge in Morris
Communications.6 7 In that case, the debtor sold stock in a company for
$5,000.1"8 Within a matter of months, the value of the stock rose to
$286,000 because of unpredictable developments in the market area for
cellular phone service. It appears that the acquired company went from a
one in twenty-two chance of procuring a cellular license from the FCC
under a lottery system, to an assured partnership in a license with the
other twenty-one applicants pursuant to a full settlement.
From a review of the facts, one can see how the bankruptcy judge
was truly concerned that a valuable asset had been transferred from the
estate. To the court, blinded by hindsight, the debtor sold a $286,000 asset
for $5,000, notwithstanding that according to the court the parties acted in
good faith in an arm's length transaction. Nonetheless, to avoid the trans-
fer for the benefit of the entire estate, the court had to find that a fraudu-
lent transfer occurred. The reasonably equivalent value rubric was a con-
venient mechanism by which to doom the transfer. By resorting to a
hypothetical market, for none in fact existed, the court concluded that
$50,000 (not the $5,000 paid) represented the fair market value of the
stock at the time of the transfer.' 69 Consequently,. because the debtor was
also insolvent at the time of the transfer, the transfer was avoided and the
property ordered returned to the estate.170
The Fourth Circuit reversed.17 ' First, the court concluded that the
(2) the fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a
different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to estab-
lish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party
either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefore or if he
sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold
he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preced-
ing sentences with respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types of
disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any
bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to
be commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that any such approval
must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is not
commercially reasonable.
ld.
167 See Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.) 75
Bankr. 619 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990).
16$ Id. at 621.
169 Id. at 629.
170 Id. at 628-29.
"' Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d
1991]
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determination of reasonably equivalent value must be made at the time of
the transfer. 17 1 Second, the court held that the value determination must
be made on a case-by-case basis, with special heed given to the market
price.'73 Nonetheless, the court did not hold that the fair market value of
the asset was necessarily dispositive of the reasonably equivalent value
issue. The court avoided the issue because there was no market value for
the asset. There was no evidence of comparable sales or bids on similar
property. Rather, the court focused on the conditions surrounding the dis-
position of the asset. There was no evidence of bad faith. The debtor and
the buyer were both willing parties dealing at arm's length. Thus, the
court held that the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous in its finding
that reasonably equivalent value was lacking.' 4
Morris Communications is merely the latest in a line of cases em-
bracing a functional approach to the reasonably equivalent value issue.
Distilling these cases, one can deduce a more disciplined approach to this
complex and troubling area. The court should consider a trilogy of indica-
tors in assessing reasonably equivalent value. First, did the parties to the
transfer act in good faith? Good faith should include "(1) an honest belief
in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take uncon-
scionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent, or knowledge of the fact
that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others."'1 5
Second, was the transfer between a willing purchaser and a willing seller
at a price to which they agreed at arm's length? In addressing this issue,
the court should consider the "bargaining position of the parties," their
relationship, the prevailing market conditions, and the "marketability of
the property transferred.' 6 Third, if a market for the asset exists, what
is the fair market value at the time of the transfer? The astute reader,
knowledgeable about basic economic theory, readily recognizes that the
answer to indicators one and two should have a direct impact on the an-
swer to indicator three. After all, the definition of the fair market value of
something is the price arrived at by arm's length negotiation between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither acting under compulsion.
Much to the chagrin of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code and the
458, 459 (4th Cir. 1990).
172 Id. at 466.
173 Id. at 467.
174 Id. at 474.
17' Southern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 66 A.D.2d 178, 183, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (App. Div.
1978).
M Cook, supra note 20, at 278.
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UFTA, the functional approach thrusts good faith back into the reasona-
bly equivalent value maelstrom, a fact consistent with post-Code and
UFTA case law.17 Thus, good faith in one variety or another is still very
much alive in the reasonably equivalent value determination, not as proof
of the prima facie case, but as a badge of fair value.178
Reasonably equivalent value presupposes a range of values with the
parameters of good faith and an arm's length transaction providing sub-
stance.'" 9 It will be the rare case, indeed, where indicators one and two
are met and not indicator three because each factor builds on itself.180
Good faith is necessary for a finding of a willful arm's length transaction
which, in turn, is necessary for a finding that the price paid is in the
appropriate range of values.
Reasonably equivalent value recognizes that, from a creditor's view,
the value requirement could logically be tied to the liquidation value of
the asset and not necessarily its going concern value. After all, the fraudu-
lent transfer affects the unsecured creditor's ability to realize upon its
debtor's assets by execution, a procedure that usually results in a price
more like liquidation value than going concern value. Thus, the courts
have never required a dollar-for-dollar exchange."8" Something less than
the actual market value of the asset may be acceptable so long as the
values exchanged do not shock the conscience.' 81 "Inadequacy of price
does not mean an honest difference of opinion as to price, but a considera-
tion so far short of the real value of the property as to startle a correct
mind, or shock the moral sense.' 8 Again, it is hard to imagine the case
where the parties acted in good faith, reaching a price through a willful
sale at arm's length, and still conclude that the values exchanged shock the
conscience. Thus, in practice, indicators one and two will serve as proxies
"I See, e.g., Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.),
914 F.2d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 1990). Under the Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA, the drafters dropped
good faith from the definition of reasonably equivalent value.
178 See, e.g., Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.),
914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990); Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi Fin. Corp.), 119 Bankr. 106
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
179 See Freitag v. Strand of Atlantic City, 205 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1953) (bona fides of exchange
must be determined in light of value of property conveyed).
1 0 See Anderson Indus., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Anderson Indus., Inc.), 55 Bankr. 922, 927-28
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985).
"' See, e.g., Mancuso v. Champion (In re Dondi Fin. Corp.), 119 Bankr. 106, 109 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1990).
Id.
185 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraudulent Conveyances § 18, at 708 (1968).
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for indicator three in most if not all cases."" Therefore, as long as the
divergence from the actual fair market value arises in an arm's length
transaction and is attributable to good faith negotiations, then the transfer
price is within the range of acceptable consideration, that is, reasonably
equivalent value.' 85 This concept recognizes that the buyer can get a good
deal, even a great deal, but not an obscene deal at the expense of the
debtor's creditors, that is, when the debtor is insolvent.
The functional approach to reasonably equivalent value recognizes
that the purpose of fraudulent transfer law is not to allow the debtor to
re-trade a transaction struck in good faith and arrived at by arm's length
negotiations. Such a transfer should not be a viable target of fraudulent
transfer law.
1. Date on Which Reasonably Equivalent Value Is Determined
The relevant time for determining the existence of reasonably
equivalent value is at the time the transfer is deemed to have occurred.'
Subsequent appreciation or depreciation of the value of the property
should be irrelevant.187
In Kupetz v. Wolf,'ss the court further honed the law regarding the
time at which reasonably equivalent value must be assessed. In Kupetz,
the sellers sold a business to a well-financed buyer in exchange for reason-
ably equivalent value. The buyer then entered into a leveraged buyout
with a third party. The trustee argued that the court should collapse and
review all the transactions to determine whether reasonably equivalent
value existed.' The court disagreed, holding that the transactions were
' Indicators one and two are similar to the "method, manner, time, place, and terms" tests
embodied in UCC § 9-504. See UCC § 9-504. "The 'method, manner, time, place, and terms' tests
are really proxies for 'insufficient price,' and their importance lies almost exclusively in the extent
they protect against an unfairly low price." J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 26-9, at 1109 (2d ed. 1980).
183 Cf Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 1984) (where there are indicia
of a bona fide financing arrangement, not designed as a shield against other creditors, lack of percepti-
ble direct benefit should not be viewed as tantamount to lack of fair consideration). The UFTA
implicitly recognizes this principle by excluding transfers pursuant to Article 9 and real property
foreclosure sale from fraudulent transfer liability. See UFTA § 3(b), 8(e)(2), 7A U.L.A. 639, 650,
662 (1984).
"" See Prevue Prods., Inc. v. Morton Shoe Co. (In re Morton Shoe Co.), 24 Bankr. 1003, 1011
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(d) (1988).
"87 See Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 914
F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990).
18 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
189 Id. at 845.
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separate and that only the first transaction was relevant in determining
whether the debtor's transfer to the sellers was fraudulent."' Kupetz
teaches that separate transfers-intended to be separate-are not lumped
together for the purpose of assessing reasonably equivalent value.
2. Indirect Benefits and Third-Party Transactions
Often the threshold question here is whether the payment or guar-
anty by a subsidiary of a parent's debt is reasonably equivalent value.191
There are two lines of cases addressing reasonably equivalent value in
2 Id.
x The payment or guaranty by the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary's debt is less problem-
atic because the courts have held that the parent presumably benefits from a reduction in debt of its
"asset," i.e., the subsidiary's stock it holds. This may not necessarily be the case. For example, you
represent Bravo Corp. which wants to enter into a data-processing contract with Lima Corp., the
wholly-owned subsidiary of November Corp. Bravo demands November Corp. to guarantee Lima
Corp.'s obligations under the data processing contract. Do the transactions contemplated generate any
fraudulent transfer risks for Bravo?
The guaranty fact pattern depicts the classic downstream guaranty situation. Most courts would
conclude that because November owned the stock in Lima, if the transaction benefited Lima, that
benefit would "ride-up" to November through the stock ownership. See, e.g., Lawrence Paperboard
Corp. v. Arlington Trust Co. (In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp.), 76 Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987). But what if Lima is hopelessly insolvent at the time of the guaranty? If so, the guaranty
by November may well have been a fraudulent transfer. Why? Because the unsecured creditors of
November are harmed by the transaction. Assuming no increase in November's net worth, a safe
assumption when the subsidiary is in a precarious financial situation, November's unsecured creditors
will go to judgment and execute on the worthless stock in Lima, a hopelessly insolvent company. At
the same time, the creditors would have to contend with the claims of Bravo to November's assets. See
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990); see Flas-
chen, Recent Bankruptcy Decisions Threaten Lenders with Increased Liability, 11 BUstNzss LAw-
YER UPDATE, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 1, 2, 9.
Now, you again represent Bravo Corp. who wants to enter into a data processing contract with
Foxtrot, Inc. Foxtrot wholly-owns Hotel Corp. and Echo Co., both of which will indirectly benefit
from the proposed data processing agreement. Bravo has never contracted with Foxtrot before and
contemplates obtaining guaranties from Hotel and Echo. Do the transactions contemplated generate
any fraudulent transfer risks for Bravo?
The guaranty fact pattern depicts the classic upstream guaranty situation. Unlike the down-
stream guaranty, courts are reluctant to find the existence of reasonably equivalent value in the up-
stream guaranty context. See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. Metro Communications, Inc. (In re Metro Com-
munications, Inc.), 95 Bankr. 921, 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). Here, Hotel and Echo (subsidiaries
of Foxtrot) are guarantying a data processing contract between Foxtrot and Bravo. The fact pattern
suggests that indirect benefits for Hotel and Echo do exist. It is imperative that these indirect benefits
be memorialized. Although the upstream guaranty battle is always difficult, it can be won based on
the indirect benefit or identity of interest approach. See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
661 F.2d 979, 988 (2d Cir. 1981). If Hotel and Echo are using or benefiting in some way from the
data processing, then the indirect benefit approach might be satisfied. If the data processing arrange-
ment between Bravo and Foxtrot is necessary for Hotel and Echo to function effectively, then both the
indirect benefit and identity of interest tests may be satisfied.
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third-party transactions.
One line of cases supports the proposition that while the payment by
a subsidiary of its parent's debt constitutes value, the value is generally
not reasonably equivalent.192 A case in point is In re Computer Universe,
Inc., 9' in which the court stated the general rule that "an insolvent
debtor receives less than a reasonably equivalent value where it transfers
its property in exchange for consideration that passes to a third party. 1 94
In Computer Universe, the debtor transferred computer equipment in sat-
isfaction of a debt owed by the debtor's parent to the creditor. The court
held that value given by the creditor must enhance the debtor's financial
position to constitute reasonably equivalent value.1 5 Consequently, a rea-
sonably equivalent value was lacking. The maxim that payment solely for
the benefit of another is not reasonably equivalent value bears heavily in
this type of case. The courts holding this view read literally the language
in Section 548(a)(2)(A) and do not permit the indirect benefit to the
debtor to be calculated unless the debtor actually received the value.1 96
This analysis is brittle, having been chipped away in recent cases. '9
Under this interpretation, possibly only a downstream guaranty would
constitute reasonably equivalent value.
The weight of authority, however, acknowledges that indirect bene-
fits received by a debtor for guaranteeing the payment of a third-party's
debt may constitute reasonably equivalent value.198 A germinal case re-
garding indirect benefits is Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.'99 Rubin involved the measurement of value received by guarantors of
debts for the obligations guaranteed. In Rubin, a complex network of cor-
292 E.g., Older v. Winslow (In re Winslow Plumbing, Heating and Contracting Co.), 424 F.
Supp. 910, 914, 915 (D. Conn. 1976).
13 Hall v. Arthur Young and Co. (In re Computer Universe, Inc.), 58 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986).
19 Id. at 30-31; see Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979); cf Rubin v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991 (2d Cir. 1981).
195 Computer Universe, 58 Bankr. at 31.
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., First Software Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l (In re First Software Corp.), 107
Bankr. 417 (D. Mass. 1989).
18 See, e.g., Klein, 610 F.2d at 1047; First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc.
(In re Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc.), 110 Bankr. 414, 420 (D. Minn. 1990); Murphy v. Capi-
tal Bank (In re Rodriguez), 77 Bankr. 944, 946 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Garrett v. Falkner (In re
Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982). Although the trustee always
shoulders the risk of nonpersuasion, the burden of producing evidence may shift to the transferee in
an indirect benefits case. See Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc., 110 Bankr. at 418-19.
199 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
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porations cashed checks, sold money orders, and issued food stamps. Man-
ufacturers Hanover Trust lent money to the companies to help the check
cashing operation distribute cash. Manufacturers Hanover Trust's loans
were often guaranteed by other companies within the network. After the
network filed for bankruptcy, the trustee tried to set aside Manufacturers
Hanover Trust's liens on the guarantor entities' cash, arguing that the
loans were fraudulent transfers because the guarantors had not received
fair consideration for their guaranty obligations. The district court found
that the guaranties were supported by fair consideration because all of the
companies in the network had been operated as one large conglomerate
and therefore possessed an identity of economic interest.200
Refusing to rely on the identity of interests rationale'" alone, the
Second Circuit required a complete factual analysis of the extent to which
each guarantor received economic value in exchange for the obligations it
guaranteed. While acknowledging the many cases that have held that
transfers made to benefit third parties are not made for fair consideration,
the Second Circuit stated its view of indirect benefits:
If the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in the
debtor's hands, or if the giving of the consideration to the third person oth-
erwise confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then the debtor's net
worth has been preserved . . . provided, of course, that the value of the
benefit received by the debtor approximates the value of the property or
obligation he has given up .... In ... these situations, the net effect of the
transactions on the debtor's estate is demonstrably insignificant, for he has
received, albeit indirectly, either an asset or the discharge of a debt worth
approximately as much as the property he has given up or the obligation he
has incurred.2
0 2
Rubin stands for the proposition that the fact that a third party ini-
tially received consideration given for the debtor's obligation does not nec-
essarily mean that reasonably equivalent value is lacking for the debtor.20 3
Rather, Rubin requires the court to compare what the debtor actually
received for its obligation with what the debtor actually gave up.21 When
there exists a significant disparity from the value received and the obliga-
2" Id. at 988.
201 See infra notes 129-63 and accompanying text.
'o Rubin, 661 F.2d at 991-92.
2, Id. at 992-93.
'' Id. at 993.
19911
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tion assumed, then reasonably equivalent value is lacking.20 5
The reason for this requirement is obvious: If the debtor receives property
or discharges or secures an antecedent debt that is substantially equivalent
in value to the property given or obligation incurred by him in exchange,
then the transaction has not significantly affected his estate and his creditors
have no cause to complain. By the same token, however, if the benefit of the
transaction to the debtor does not substantially offset its cost to him, then
his creditors have suffered, and, in the language of § 67(d) [Bankruptcy Act
of 1898], the transaction was not supported by "fair" consideration.10
In In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp.,207 the court addressed the
complex issue of intercorporate guaranties. The question in Lawrence Pa-
perboard Corp. was whether the debtor's intercorporate upstream and
cross-stream guaranties were executed in exchange for fair consideration.
The official unsecured creditors' committee urged the court to find that
the guaranty of a third party's debt is prima facie not made for fair con-
sideration.2 08 The court, however, embraced the Rubin analysis, noting
further that the mere failure of the guaranties to recite that they were
made for consideration was not controlling. °9 Consequently, the court ob-
served that downstream guaranties are generally supported by reasonably
equivalent value because the parent will receive the benefit of any loan.210
Moreover, the court suggested that upstream (subsidiary guarantees par-
ent's debt) and cross-stream (sister corporations guarantee each others'
debt) guaranties may be supported by reasonably equivalent value where
indirect benefits attributable to the business relationship exist, funds are
disbursed from obligor to guarantor, and reciprocal guaranties exist.211
A bankruptcy court employed a similar analysis in Murphy v. Gen-
eral Electric Credit Corp. (In re Rodriguez).1 2 In reviewing a three-
party transaction, the court concluded that the transfer by the debtor was
not made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value.21  The court held
105 Id. at 994.
06 Id. at 991.
07 Lawrence Paperboard Corp. v. Arlington Trust Co. (In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp.), 76
Bankr. 866 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).




"1' 77 Bankr. 939 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987), affd, General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Murphy (In re
Rodriguez), 895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990).
213 Id. at 942.
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that the parent-debtor's payments did not increase the value of its subsidi-
ary; rather, the payments "merely reduced the subsidiary's potential defi-
ciency judgment while delaying foreclosure."21 While noting that a pay-
ment by the debtor of a third party's debt may in certain circumstances
constitute reasonably equivalent value, the court nevertheless held that
there was no reasonably equivalent value present where the debtor's net
worth was not increased.215
Furthermore, other forms of indirect economic benefits may consti-
tute, by themselves or in the aggregate, reasonably equivalent value. For
example, goodwill, in a business context, may constitute reasonably
equivalent value.21 ' Mere self-serving statements, however, do not suffice
to establish goodwill; evidence such as a long record of "highly profitable
operations," a "valuable customer list," or a "trade name developed by the
company," is needed.217 Furthermore, the maintenance of a parent's fi-
nancial strength may constitute reasonably equivalent value.21 " Yet an-
other example is where a smaller company uses its larger affiliate's distri-
bution system to distribute its own products.21 9 Judge Posner, applying
the "indirect benefits" approach, cogently stated:
Whether Xonics Photochemical derived a benefit from its guarantees was a
factual question, and we cannot say that the bankruptcy judge's resolution
of it was clearly erroneous. Although the primary benefit of the loan ac-
crued to the borrower, Xonics Medical Systems, that company's fortunes
were entwined with those of Xonics Photochemical because the smaller
company used its larger affiliate's distribution system to distribute its own
products. The benefit may not have been great but neither was the cost.
Xonics Photochemical was not paying any interest on the loan; it just was a
guarantor, and all concerned assumed that the loan would be duly repaid
and no guarantor would be out of pocket. The co-signed note was to secure
a line of credit on which Xonics Photochemical as well as Xonics Medical
Systems could draw so again there was benefit.22
All of these benefits should be quantified.22'
214 Id. at 941.
:,a Id. at 942.
216 E.g., Colfax, Inc. v. D'Agostino (In re J.K. Chemicals, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 897, 898 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1981).
217 Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 983-84 (lst Cir. 1983).
"'-See, e.g., Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1958).
:19 See In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1988).
210 Id.
21 See Lawrence Paperboard Corp. v. Arlington Trust Co. (In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp.),
1991]-
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Courts have also viewed the three-party transaction through a differ-
ent lens. Where there was sufficient commingling of affairs to establish an
identity of interests, a court may ignore the separate existence of each
entity for the purposes of finding reasonably equivalent value.2 The ar-
gument (focusing on common economic identity) is relevant to show that
the continued financial health was vitally important and was thus a
benefit.2
Recently, in Tryit Enterprises v. General Electric Capital Corp. (In
re Tryit Enterprises),24 the court embraced a sensible approach to assess-
ing the existence of fair consideration under the identity of interests the-
ory. The court held that because the debtors held themselves out as a
single business enterprise and availed themselves of the financial benefits
derived from their consolidated financial condition, the defendant did in
fact give fair consideration to the debtors' business enterprise.225 Conse-
quently, no fraudulent transfer existed.
In Tryit Enterprises, the debtors incurred obligations for each other
through cross-guarantee and cross-collateralization provisions in the loan
agreements, ostensibly obligating them to repay more funds than they had
received.
Since the assets of affiliated corporations are not generally treated as a com-
mon pool available to the creditors of each affiliate, unusual circumstances
must be present to so treat them. The circumstances present should be such
as to make it inequitable to allow the other affiliates to set up the principle
of limited liability due to the fact that the creditors of all the affiliates had
thought they were dealing with a unitary enterprise. 226
The court viewed the debtors-separate legal entities under state
law-as a single business enterprise under fraudulent transfer law. Ac-
knowledging that "[t]he court is to look through the forms to the realities
of the relationship between two or more entities to determine whether
76 Bankr. 866, 874-75 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
"" See, e.g., Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970); In re Nelsen, 24 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1982).
223 See Walls, Promises to Keep: Intercorporate Guarantees and Fraudulent Transfers in
Bankruptcy, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 219, 231-32 (1987).
224 121 Bankr. 217 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
225 Id. at 224.
226 Id. at 223 (citation omitted).
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each is separate or a single business enterprise," ' the court based its
conclusion on a host of factors. The defendant conceded that it knew that
the debtors were separate legal entities; nevertheless, the defendant (a
creditor) proved that it treated the debtors as a single business enterprise,
relying on the combined assets in assessing fraudulent transfer liability.2 8
The court also found that the debtors were working towards consolidation,
held themselves out in business as a single enterprise, used "Tryit Enter-
prises" to refer to all the debtors (including use of the name in a tele-
phone listing), used the same "Tryit Enterprises" letterhead for business,
and listed themselves as a single enterprise in trade directories.22 More-
over, the court was impressed that a vendor sued one of the debtors, "in-
correctly" naming it "Tryit Enterprises. "230
The court further concluded that other factors were present that per-
suaded it to view the separate entities as a single enterprise, including "a
'corporate' office that pays the bills for its affiliates, [where] each affiliate
is charged with its proportional share of the main office expense, 21 and
''situations in which the same principals have overlapping ownership
among the business entities, operate from the same office, use the same
telephone number and post office box, have centralized accounting, and
refer to all of the companies by a single name." '232
Although the courts have become more receptive to arguments disre-
garding the formal structure of a transaction, such as in Kupetz and Wie-
boldt, they have been more reluctant in disregarding corporate formalities
in the indirect benefit situation. Take, for example, the holding company
that wholly owns one operating subsidiary. Most creditors, probably all
consensual creditors, know what type of structure with which they are
dealing. The only asset in the holding company is the ownership of the
subsidiary's stock. The true value in the corporate structure is in its oper-
ating subsidiary. Transfers of all types flow back and forth between the
parent and subsidiary. While some of these transfers may be related to the
actual transaction at hand, some may not. The Internal Revenue Service
may recognize this corporate structure as one enterprise, allowing the
structure to file a consolidated tax return.2 3 Moreover, state law may
117 Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
'21 Id. at 221.
229 Id. at 221-22.
1*0 Id. at 222.
21 Id. at 223 (citation omitted).
.:2 Id. (citation omitted).
9 I.R.C. §§ 1501-04 (1988).
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recognize this corporate structure as one enterprise, as a joint venture,
partnership by estoppel, or as a single business enterprise."' Further-
more, the Bankruptcy Code may recognize, through substantive consolida-
tion, the possible treatment of the structure as one enterprise. 3 5 Corporate
formalities aside, one is hard-pressed to understand why the courts are not
more receptive to arguments that the entire corporate structure should be
treated as one enterprise for fraudulent transfer purposes. One commenta-
tor has stated:
It should berecognized, however, that certain members of a family of cor-
porations may convey certain benefits on each other by virtue of intercom-
pany transactions unrelated, as well as related, to the alleged fraudulent
transaction. These benefits can be best included in the calculus of reasona-
bly equivalent value by considering those quantifiable benefits reasonably
expected at the time of the transaction to accrue in the future to the debtor,
directly or indirectly."'
Courts and commentators agree that the determination of reasonably
equivalent value is more complicated in the context of the three-way
transaction. The courts, therefore, have developed the doctrines of indirect
benefits and identity of interests to help to determine the existence of rea-
sonably equivalent value in complex transactions. "The doctrines, how-
ever, tend to be skewed in one direction or another, or depend too much
on how the transactions are characterized. The latest approach demands
quantification of these burdens and benefits but is skewed, because its re-
sults are dependent on the timing of the bankruptcy petition." 3 7 The
courts' reluctance in collapsing the formal structure of the corporate group
diverges from the realities of modern transactions, places a premium on
inefficient machinations concerning the structure of a transaction, and
hampers the structuring of modern transactions, all in an inefficient effort
to elevate form over substance. In determining the extent of a transfer
subject to a fraudulent transfer analysis, the courts are quick to observe
that they are not confined by the formal structure of the transaction.238
Tryit Enters., 121 Bankr. at 222.
11 U.S.C. § 510 (1988).
M Littman, Multiple Intent, Veil Piercing, and Burdens and Benefits: Fraudulent Convey-
ance Law and Multiparty Transactions, 39 UNIV. MIAMI L. REv. 307, 339-40 (1985).
237 Id. at 339.
'3 See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor Court Realty
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v.
Sehottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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Why, then, should the result be dictated by the formal corporate structure
at hand when the realities of the situation prove otherwise?
C. Insolvency
If a debtor is or becomes insolvent and does not receive reasonably
equivalent value from the transferee, the transfer is voidable regardless of
intent.2" 9 According to one commentator, the insolvency requirement,
when coupled with the value requirement, ensures that only a transaction
which actually harms the creditors is avoidable.2 " Consequently, the in-
solvency requirement is a key component of the first-order limitations to
fraudulent transfer liability.
Insolvency is a term of art under the Code. It includes a "balance-
sheet" test, a test focusing on whether the business debtor is left with
unreasonably small capital, 2 " and an "insolvency" test, which focuses on
whether the debtor intends to incur debts beyond its ability to pay.24
Under the Code, a debtor is insolvent when the sum of its debts is
:8 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
40 See Rasmussen, Guarantees and Section 548(aX2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 UNIv. CH.
L. REv. 194 (1985).
... This article focuses on the balance-sheet test of insolvency. While most of the discussion
applies equally to the remaining tests under the Code and the UFTA, there are a number of issues
concerning these tests not discussed in the article. For a detailed and persuasive analysis of the "un-
reasonably small capital" test, see Markell, supra note 3, at 494-508. Mr. Markell is correct when he
states "it is inevitable that arguments will arise pressing for new or expansive interpretations of [the
'unreasonably small capital'] action." Id. at 494 (footnote omitted). Mr. Markell is equally correct
when he observes that "lawyers seeking to set aside questionable transfers will inevitably come to rely
more heavily upon the unreasonably small capital section." Id. (footnote omitted). This is largely due
to the ability of lawyers and accountants to manipulate the balance sheet to manufacture solvency.
The crux of the "unreasonably small capital" test is that a debtor is not entitled to increase its risk of
failure by, for example, increasing the risk of outstanding loans beyond a certain level. See Note,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1509 (1987). What
is unreasonably small capital generally "depends on the nature of the enterprise in which one is
engaged." See Jenney v. Vining, 120 N.H. 377, 379, 415 A.2d 681, 683 (1980).
242 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (1988); see also REVISED MODEL BUSIN.ss CORP. Aar § 6.40,
Off. Comment 2 (3d ed. 1985) (explanation of how equitable insolvency test is to be applied). For a
thorough analysis of insolvency under fraudulent transfer law, see Cook & Mendales, The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANXR. L.J. 87 (1988). The UFTA
counterparts are §§ 2 and 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 639, 648, 653 (1984). Due diligence for a capital
adequacy analysis would include: a review of historical performance, projections, industry trends,
product/market strategies, operating cost structures, capital spending programs, contingent liabilities,
and financial flexibility; interviews with corporate and division management; visits at major plant
locations; interviews with advisors, experts, and other professionals; thorough review of documents;
and comparisons with similar companies and competitors. See P. Much, Leveraged Transactions and
Capital Adequacy: Addressing the Economic Risks of Fraudulent Conveyances 12-13 (1989). Mr.
Much's monograph is invaluable.
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greater than all of its assets at a "fair valuation"-the "balance sheet"
approach.2 " In employing the Code's balance sheet test of insolvency, the
fair valuation and not the book value of the assets is used.2 44 Exempt
assets are explicitly excluded from the calculations as well as any property
which could be the subject of a Section 548(a) action.245 Rights of subro-
gation and of contribution are assets that must be quantified; however,
one should value doubtful or contingent claims at less than face value.246
Moreover, a liability on a guaranty may be viewed as creating a claim
under Sections 101(4) and 101(9) and is also an asset.247 Furthermore,
when particular assets of the debtor are not easily liquidated, the face
value is generally discounted.248
Fair value does not mean the amount the property would bring in the worst
circumstances or in the best .... For example, a forced sale price is not fair
value though it may be used as evidence on the question of fair value....
The general idea of fair value is the amount of money the debtor could
raise from its property in a short period of time, but not so short as to
approximate a forced sale, if the debtor operated as a reasonably prudent
and diligent businessman with his interest in mind, especially a proper con-
cern for the payment of his debts.249
Some courts have embraced going concern values for inventory and
243 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988). See Varon v. Trimble, Marshall & Goldman, P.C. (In re Euro-
Swiss Int'l Corp.), 33 Bankr. 872, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Ohio Corrugating Co. v.
DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 430, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (court
employed equity or cash flow analysis, focusing on the debtor's ability to pay its debts as they became
due).
244 Euro-Swiss Int'l Corp., 33 Bankr. at 885-86.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(i), (ii) (1988); Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 253-54.
24' Join-In Int'l (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. New York Wholesale Distribs. Corp. (In re Join-In Int'l
(U.S.A.) Ltd.), 56 Bankr. 555, 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); see 1A BANKR. SERv. L. ED. § 5D:76,
at 60 (1990).
W See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (19) (1988).
248 Northern Va. Bank. v. Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc. (In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc.), 9
Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); see Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d
573, 577 (1st Cir. 1980).
24' Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 430, 436-37
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (quoting In re Joe Flynn Rare Coins, 81 Bankr. 1009, 1017 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1988)). See generally 1A BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 5D:75, at 60 (1990). A co-op of commentators
has concluded that the UFCA's "present fair salable value" and the UFTA and Bankruptcy Code's
"fair valuation" probably should be viewed as interchangeable standards. See Cieri, Heiman, supra




not for equipment,250 while others have disregarded illiquid assets in the
solvency calculus,25' and still others have employed a temporal standard in
assessing which valuation to use, that is, a presumption that going concern
value is applicable unless at the relevant point in time the business is so ill
that the liquidation value of the assets is more appropriate.252 One com-
mentator has concluded that the proper valuation is the going concern
value of the assets as a whole.25
The UFTA definition of asset is designed to focus the courts' atten-
tion on the property available to the debtor's unsecured creditors. The
definition of asset under the UFTA includes all of the property of the
debtor, expressly excluding any property that has been disposed of in such
a way as to "hinder, delay, or defraud creditors" of the debtor.254 Assets
are also defined to exclude exempt property, property subject to a valid
lien, and an interest in property held by the entirety to the extent that the
property is not subject to claims against only one of the joint parties in
interest.255 The comment to Section 1 of the UFTA notes that the UFTA
continues in substance the UFCA definition of assets;25 the only substan-
tial difference is that in order to be an asset under the UFCA, the prop-
erty would have to be leviable.257 Thus, the comment explains, a surety's
subrogation or contribution claim could be an asset under the UFTA,
even though it would not be leviable,2 8 and, therefore, would not be an
asset under the UFCA.
Because of the similarity between Section 548(a)(2) and the UFTA
formulations of insolvency, a discussion of cases decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Code regarding assets should afford an accurate sense of the stan-
dard under the UFTA as well. In Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco
Corp.),59 the First Circuit considered a transfer by an allegedly insolvent
debtor. The defendant argued that the debtor was not insolvent at the time
of the transfer as long as the court included, among the debtor's assets, the
'" See, e.g., Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 Bankr. at 437-38.
241 See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 505 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
See, e.g., Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100
Bankr. 127, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
252 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 101.31[5], at 101-93 to -94 (15th ed. 1988). See generally
Cieri, Heiman, supra note 56, at 361-62.
' UFTA § 2(d), 7A U.L.A. 639, 648 (1984).
'" UFTA § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. at 644.
a UFTA § 1, Comment 1, 7A U.L.A. at 643.
' Id.
s Of course, a creditor's bill in equity or a turnover action may nevertheless reach the asset.
" 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983).
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value of the corporate goodwill. The court held that the goodwill asserted
by the defendant was not the type of hard asset that the court could take
into account because the defendant had "provided nothing more than self-
serving statements to back his goodwill claims." 6° The court did observe,
however, that goodwill could be considered in some cases if there were
strong evidence of its existence and value, such as a record of a business'
high profitability over an extended period, a customer list, or a trade
name developed in the course of the debtor's business. 26' Because evidence
was lacking, the court was unable to include any goodwill as an asset to
establish the debtor's solvency.2" 2
In Harmon v. Sorlucco (In re Sorlucco),62 the court determined that
a lumber operation's value included the expectations of increased profit-
ability. 6 4 At the time of the transfer, the debtor fully expected, and had
every reason to expect, that the Small Business Administration ("SBA")
would roll over the lumber operation's financing in a way that would
enhance the value of the enterprise. 2 5 The fact that the SBA later
changed its policy and did not renew the financing did not affect the value
determination at the time of the transfer.2 66
Insolvency requires a comparison of assets and debts. There are sev-
eral methods by which a court may value the assets of a debtor to deter-
mine whether the alleged fraudulent transfer left the defendant insolvent.
Even when the value of the remaining unencumbered assets are sufficient
under a fair market value analysis to prevent a finding of insolvency, the
risk that the transfer may be found fraudulent may still exist. Rather than
placing a fair market value upon the debtor's assets, the court may use the
forced-sale value, that is, the amount that could be received from the
property from an immediate sale, where the seller had to sell but the
buyer was under no compulsion to buy. The difference in the results of
the two methods of valuation is accentuated when the debtor's assets are
illiquid and a forced-sale would result in a severe discount. In determin-
ing fair valuation (the test under the UFTA and presumably under the
Bankruptcy Code), a court must consider the property's intrinsic value,
:Go Id. at 984.
101 Id.
:62 Id.
263 68 Bankr. 748 (Bankr, D.N.H. 1986).
24 Id. at 751.
:8 Id. at 750.
26 Id. at 751.
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selling value, and earning power.2 7
The UFTA section defining insolvency incorporates a definition of
debt that expressly excludes secured debt.2 8' Because the unsecured credi-
tors of the debtor are not able to reach property subject to a valid lien and
because the creditors holding such liens are able to satisfy their claims
against the encumbered property, the drafters determined that the policies
of fraudulent transfer law would not be served by including either prop-
erty subject to a lien as an asset or the obligations secured by such prop-
erty as a debt for purposes of the solvency calculus.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc. (In re Metro
Communications, Inc.),26 the court articulated a sensible approach in as-
sessing the insolvency of the debtor. Mellon commenced an adversary pro-
ceeding to determine its secured status. The committee of unsecured credi-
tors, as intervenors, charged that the transactions involving the debtor and
Mellon rendered the debtor insolvent and/or left the debtor with an un-
reasonably small capital, constituting a fraudulent transfer. After trial, the
court concluded that Mellon was not a secured creditor, having failed to
meet its burden of proof as to its perfected status.2 70 Moreover, among
other things, the court concluded that the debtor's guarantee of the Mellon
loan to its parent was a fraudulent transfer.27' Therefore, the court or-
dered Mellon to prepare a complete and accurate accounting of all pay-
ments from the debtor and to disgorge those payments, along with legal
interest from the date of receipt.272
In assessing whether Mellon gave reasonably equivalent value to the
debtor, the court relied on the following facts: "Debtor guaranteed a $1.85
million loan granted to its parent, TCI. TCI used the funds to purchase
Debtor's shares from Debtor's former shareholders. TCI collateralized the
loan by pledging Debtor's stock, Debtor's guaranty and Debtor's security
interest in all of its unencumbered assets. '27 3 The debtor, therefore, had
granted a security interest in all of its assets for $1.85 million of allegedly
contingent debt. The court concluded, however, that the contingency of the
debt was illusory. TCI was simply a shell holding company. The only
:47 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 101.31, at 101-84.1 to -87 (15th ed. 1989).
1* UFTA § 2(e), 7A U.L.A. 639, 648 (1984).
:69 95 Bankr. 921 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
170 Id. at 929.
' Id. at 934. Moreover, the Mellon Bank court held that the burden of proof on all elements
rested with the party asserting the transfer as fraudulent and that the standard of proof for a construc-
tive fraudulent transfer action was a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 932-33.
171 Id.
" Id. at 933.
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means of debt repayment that ever existed was through the debtor. There-
fore, the court concluded that the debtor "incurred an obligation for which
it received substantially less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange." '74
In assessing insolvency, the court employed the following analysis (in
dictum):
Debtor had $1.85 million in debt for which it had pledged all of its assets
and for which Debtor received no part of the actual $1.85 million. Debtor's
former shareholders were paid $1.85 million in exchange for their shares of
stock. If, as it is often stated, fair market value is the sum a willing buyer
will pay a willing seller in an [arm's length] transaction, then Debtor's
stock had a fair valuation of $1.85 million.2 75
In other words, the price agreed upon by the parties-$1.85 million-is
the best estimate of the equity of the corporation, that is, the fair value of
its assets less liabilities. Furthermore, the debtor pledged its stock and re-
maining unencumbered assets as collateral for the $1.85 million loan, thus
eliminating existing equity. The debtor was, therefore, insolvent because
its liabilities exceeded its assets.
Some courts have been willing to treat projected cash flow as an asset
where a company is balance sheet insolvent.276 Under this analysis, "a
company having a negative net worth would not be insolvent if its busi-
ness operations were expected to produce sufficient cash to pay off its
debts as they matured. ' 277 Unlike a company's other assets, cash flow
projections are directly related to the company's business prospects and
are, therefore, contingent.2
78
As a result, cash flow is less likely to be reachable by creditors as a residual
asset should the debtor default on its obligations. Nevertheless, some recog-
nition must be given to projected cash flow for purposes of solvency analy-
sis. Even secured creditors expect to be repaid from the flow of cash rather
than from recovery of the collateral on default. 7 1
274 Id. at 934.
275 Id.
M See, e.g., Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (D.N.J. 1984); United
States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 579 (N.D. Pa. 1983), affd sub nom. United
States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); see
Note, supra note 241, at 1507.
'77 Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 579.
278 Note, supra note 241, at 1507-08.
279 Id. at 1508.
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No cases, however, have strongly embraced the asset view of cash flow.
There are also some problems with the treatment of cash flow as an addi-
tional component of hard asset value. Besides the concern of the proper
discount rate, aggregating discounted cash flow, hard assets, and goodwill
as assets may result in double counting.
Generally, the valuation of doubtful or contingent claims must be at
less than stated value.28 Unfortunately, there is a dearth of case law ana-
lyzing the treatment of contingent claims other than in the guaranty con-
text; therefore, it is to this area of the law that we must turn for
guidance. " 1
There appears to be little uniformity in the manner in which guaran-
ties are treated for purposes of determining insolvency. One view is to
treat the guaranty as a contingent liability, discounting the amount of the
guaranty by the probability of the guarantor's liability on the guaranty. 282
This approach is viewed as the "liability theory treatment" of guaran-
ties.283 Another view has included the full amount of the guaranty as a
liability but added as an offsetting asset any rights of subrogation or con-
tribution that may exist. 8" This approach is viewed as the "asset theory
treatment" of guaranties.285 Yet another view simply includes the entire
amount of the guaranty as a matured liability without any offset or reduc-
tion.286 While one can quantify a debtor's right of subrogation and contri-
bution from its parent, such reliance may be placed on the thin edge of a
wedge.287 Mr. Rosenberg cleverly points out that the value of a guaranty
as a contingent asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely be-
cause it would no longer be collectible.2 88
260 Join-In Int'l (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. New York Wholesale Distribs. Corp. (In re Join-In Int'l
(U.S.A.) Ltd.), 56 Bankr. 555, 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In the interests of finality and dis-
chargeability, bankruptcy courts are not constrained like other courts in the claims estimation process
and possess uniquely broad powers. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
28 For a thorough analysis of the treatment of guaranties, see Alces, Generic Fraud in the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 743, 746-54 (1987), and Alces & Dorr,
supra note 12, at 558-60.
2" See, e.g., In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1988); Cate v.
Nicely (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affid in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981).
"' See Coquillette, supra note 99, at 455-60.
" See, e.g., Hemphill v. T & F Land Co. (In re Hemphill), 18 Bankr. 38, 47-48 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1982).
,, See Coquillette, supra note 99, at 455-59.
" See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Oppenheim, 109 Misc. 2d 649, 440 N.Y.S.2d
829, 831 (Sup. Ct. 1981).




In Xonics Photochemical,2 89 Judge Posner made several observations
relating to the contingent nature of intercorporate guaranties. The Sev-
enth Circuit found fascinating the parties' apparent inability to recognize
the contingent nature of the intercorporate guaranties. 9 The court fur-
ther found absurd the parties' notion that any entity with contingent lia-
bilities greater than its net assets would be insolvent. 91 The court ob-
served that contingent liabilities are usually listed as a footnote on a firm's
balance sheet or are too remote or small to list at all, noting that the
debtor did not list the obligations on its balance sheet.2 92
The Xonics Photochemical court further observed that many compel-
ling reasons existed not to value contingent liabilities at their face value on
a balance sheet, including the remote nature of the liability and the fact
that the liability must be discounted by the probability of occurrence.293
The court frankly disagreed with the parties' treatment of the guaranty
for purposes of determining that the debtor was insolvent, dispelling the
"cunsettling impression that contingent liabilities must for purposes of de-
termining solvency be treated as definite liabilities even though the contin-
gency has not occurred. 2 94
The constructive fraud provisions of the UFTA require that the
debtor be insolvent at the time of the transfer or be rendered insolvent by
the transfer. 9 5 The UFTA contains the so called legal test of insolvency:
an entity is insolvent if its debts exceed its assets.296 The UFTA, in addi-
tion, incorporates the equitable test of insolvency, providing that an entity
is presumed to be insolvent if it is generally not paying its debts as they
become due. This presumption is rebuttable.291 In Cellar Lumber Co. v.
Holley,29 8 the court explained the difference between legal and equitable
insolvency: "Legal insolvency refers to the situation where the entire as-
sets of an individual are insufficient to pay his debts. A broader concept,
originating with merchants or traders, is equitable insolvency, or the in-
ability to pay debts as they become due in the ordinary course of
:s In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988).
2,o Id. at 199.
1 Id. at 200.
:92 Id.
291 Id.
2 Id. at 201.
199 UFTA §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 639, 652-53, 657 (1984).
'" UFTA § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. at 648.
.9 UFTA § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. at 648. The reason for the presumption is the practical problems
that attend proof of legal insolvency.




1. Date on Which Insolvency is Determined
The clear weight of authority suggests that the appropriate time at
which to gauge the insolvency of the debtor is the date on which the trans-
fer is deemed to have occurred under Section 548(d)(1). °° The time at
which to test for insolvency under Section 548 may substantially differ
from the time under state law.301
A minority of cases have held that the date the transfer is deemed
made should not be determinative of all issues."0 ' One court observed that
a transaction might render a party insolvent, but, through an unexpected
windfall, gain, or gift, that party might be solvent at the time when the
last technical step in perfection occurred.30 8
2. Proof of Insolvency
Insolvency is a question of fact to be proved by the trustee by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.304 There is no presumption of insolvency in a
Section 548 action. As previously discussed, this is not the case with an
action under the UFTA.
The UFTA attaches primary importance to cash flow analysis by
establishing a presumption of insolvency where a debtor is "generally not
paying his . . . debts as they become due. ' 83 05 There is a valid question
regarding the effect of the presumption of insolvency under the UFTA.
Comment 2 of the UFTA Section 2 explicitly states that this presumption
is rebuttable but leaves unanswered the effect of the presumption.308 Com-
ment 2 provides: "The presumption imposes on the party against whom
the presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of
insolvency as defined in Section 2(a) is more probable than its exis-
' Id. at 290, 224 N.E.2d at 363.
'" See, e.g., McCullough v. Ventura Constr. Co. (In re Brio Ref., Inc.), Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr.,
March 1987, at 120 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); Clay v. Traders Bank (In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp.),
11 Bankr. 515, 517-18 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); see also Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 252 ("the
relevant date of the determination of insolvency is undoubtedly the date of transfer").
:01 Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 253.
O2 See, e.g., Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp., 575 F.2d 1223, 1230-31 (8th Cir. 1978).
3oS Id.
3" Join-In Int'l (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. New York Wholesale Distribs. Corp. (In re Join-In Int'l
(U.S.A.) Ltd.), 56 Bankr. 555, 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
3- UFTA § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 648 (1984); see Cieri, Heiman, supra note 56, at 363.
"" UFTA § 2, Comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 649.
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tence."307 Thus, the drafters intended to shift to the debtor not only the
burden of production, but also the risk of nonpersuasion.308 As explained
by the section's comments, the UFTA rule is different from Federal Rule
of Evidence 301, "which explicitly leaves the 'burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion ... upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.' "309
Proof by direct evidence of the insolvency of the debtor is usually
difficult; thus, insolvency is frequently determined by inference.3 10 Courts
will generally permit a party to use the debtor's schedules, unaudited bal-
ance sheets, prepetition financial statements, and appraisal testimony as
evidence on the issue of insolvency."' If the trustee relies on balance
sheets to prove insolvency, the trustee should present "evidence to show
whether the balance sheets reflect a fair valuation of the assets."' 12 Re-
view of financial statements at various times to ensure the continuous in-
solvency of the debtor is not necessary. 13
Courts have also used the process of retrojection to aid in assessing
insolvency. Retrojection is the process by which a court works backwards
from the date of the filing of the petition to identify factors from which
insolvency may be presumed. 14 "[I]nsolvency at the prior time may be
inferred from the actual insolvency at a later date." ' 5 Retrojection is
based on the notion that it is the rare debtor who becomes insolvent over-
night; rather, insolvency is a cumulative process. When employing re-
trojection, however, the trustee must prove the absence of any substantial
changes in the debtor's assets and liabilities between the retrojection
307 See Shupack, supra note 12, at 829.
:08 Id.
500 Id. at 829-30.
310 See Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 577-78 (1st Cir. 1980).
31 See, e.g., McCullough v. Ventura Constr. Co. (In re Brio Ref., Inc.), Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr.,
March 1987, at 121 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); Lemley-Cabbiness Farms v. FDIC (In re Lemley
Estate Business Trust), 65 Bankr. 185 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33
Bankr. 642, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
3 Whitlock v. Max Goodman & Sons Realty (In re Goodman Indus., Inc.), 21 Bankr. 512, 520
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
s3 Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 Bankr. 743, 785 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 1985).
314 See Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir. 1976); New York
Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Inland
Sec. Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 345 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
I5' Fitzgerald v. Cheverie (In re Edward Harvey Co.), 68 Bankr. 851, 857 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987); Foley v. Briden (In re Arrowhead Gardens, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 296, 301 (Bankr. D. Mass.





To make out a successful Section 548(a)(1) claim, the trustee must
prove (1) a transfer to the defendant of (2) an interest in property of the
debtor (3) during the year preceding the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy (4) accomplished with the actual intent of the debtor to hinder,
delay, or defraud a creditor.3"' Furthermore, the first category of transfers
and obligations declared by the UFTA to be fraudulent is one made or
incurred with actual "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" any creditor of
the debtor.3 18 The language in the two acts appeared in the Statute of
Elizabeth319 and has been the core of fraudulent transfer law.
Fraudulent intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof.3 2° Neverthe-
less, "intent may be established by circumstantial evidence, or by infer-
ences drawn from a course of conduct." '21 Furthermore, the court may
infer fraudulent intent from the circumstances of the case. 22
Consistent with the fact that a debtor rarely will testify establishing
his actual intent to defraud, the courts have historically developed "badges
of fraud" 23 as a means circumstantially to prove the actual fraudulent
intent. 24 Time and experience have countlessly proved the reliability of
these ageless indicia of fraud.
While fraudulent acts are as varied as the fish in the sea, there has
emerged from this body of case law a number of factors to which courts
'" See Kanasky v. Randolph (In re R. Purbeck & Assocs., Ltd.), 27 Bankr. 953, 955 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1983).
317 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988). However, a debtor's intent to prefer a creditor at the expense
of its other creditors is not tantamount to fraudulent intent. See Roemelmeyer v. Intercontinental
Bank (In re Lucar Enters., Inc.), 49 Bankr. 717, 718-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
318 UFTA § (4)(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 639, 652 (1984).
ri See supra note 3.
s See Roland v. United States, 838 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Texas law);
Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582 (2d Cir. 1983); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco
Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d
1288, 1304 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
M11 See, e.g., First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986);
Devers v. Bank of Sheridan, Mont. (In re Devers), 759 F.2d 751, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1985); Farmers
Co-Operative Ass'n v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir. 1982).
:'2 Devers, 759 F.2d at 754.
s" See Boston Trading Group, Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1509 (1st Cir. 1987) ("where a
court finds things such as insolvency and inadequate consideration present, there is an allowance to
presume fraud and void the transaction").
&14 See, e.g., Roland, 838 F.2d at 1402-03; Boston Trading Group, Inc., 835 F.2d at 1509;
Kaiser, 722 F.2d at 1582. See generally 1A BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 5D:30, at 31 (1990).
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have attached weight in assessing fraudulent transfer liability. 25 These
factors include the relationship between the parties to the transaction '32
the disparity in value of the assets transferred and value given,327 the se-
crecy of the transaction, 8' the timing of the transaction,329 the existence of
a legitimate business purpose for the transaction, 30 a general transfer
without a reservation of necessities,3 3 1 the debtor's retained use of the
property transferred, 32 a transfer outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness,338 unusual clauses in the business instrument,"' and the insolvency
status of the debtor at the time of the transaction.33 5 Of course, the more
31' At Section 4(b) of the UFTA, a new feature specifies factors (badges of fraud) that may be
given consideration in inferring actual intent to defraud. See UFTA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 639, 653 (1984).
As Comment 5 accompanying § 4 of the UFTA explains, however, "[piroof of the existence of any
one or more of the factors enumerated in subsection (b) may be relevant evidence as to the debtor's
actual intent but does not create a presumption that the debtor has made a fraudulent transfer or
incurred a fraudulent obligation." UFTA § 4, Comment 5, 7A U.L.A. at 654.
318 Marc Rich & Co. A. G. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 731
F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Reynolds, 409 N.W.2d 128, 130 (S.D. 1987); Montana
Nat'l Bank v. Michels, 631 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Mont. 1981); Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, Inc.
v. DiMazzio, 37 Ohio App. 3d 162, 165, 524 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1987); cf. Columbia Int'l Corp. v.
Perry, 54 Wash. 2d 876, 877, 344 P.2d 509, 512 (1959) (close personal relationship of transferor to
transferee not conclusive of fraudulent intent).
3 Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d at 1041; United States v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423, 426 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); Tipp v. United Bank, 23 Ark. App. 176, 178, 745 S.W.2d
141, 143 (1988); DiMazzio, 524 N.E.2d at 918; Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah
1986); Butcher v. Butcher (In re Estate of Reed), 566 P.2d 587, 590 (Wyo. 1977); Lewis v. Estate of
Lewis, 45 Wash. App. 387, 391, 725 P.2d 644, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Michels, 631 P.2d at
1263.
33 Tipp, 745 S.W.2d at 143; Michels, 631 P.2d at 1263; Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d at
1041.
329 Tipp, 745 S.W.2d at 143; DiMazzio, 524 N.E.2d at 918; Wilmarth, 726 P.2d at 422;
Michels, 631 P.2d at 1263; Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d at 590; Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d
48,52-53 (Tex. 1964).
30 Tipp, 745 S.W.2d at 143; Michels, 631 P.2d at 1263; see Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d at
1041.
"' DiMazzio, 524 N.E.2d at 918; Michels, 631 P.2d at 1263; Shield, 381 S.W.2d at 53.
332 Tipp, 745 S.W.2d at 143; DiMazzio, 524 N.E.2d at 918; Wilmarth, 726 P.2d at 422;
Michels, 631 P.2d at 1263; United States v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 914 (1961).
33 Tipp, 745 S.W.2d at 143; Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d at 1041; Michels, 631 P.2d at
1263.
"" United States v. Morton, 682 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 1988); United States v. Jones,
631 F. Supp. 57, 60 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Titus (In re Titus), 75
Bankr. 256, 259 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
"' Roland v. United States, 838 F.2d 1400, 1403 (5th Cir. 1988); Adams v. Wilhite, 636
S.W.2d 851, 854-57 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 640 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. 1982). See
generally 1A BANKR. SEiRv. L. ED. § 5D:30, at 32-34 (1990); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, §§ 305-
307(a), 309, 346, at 532-36, 537-38, 605-06.
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badges of fraud present, the greater the likelihood of a court finding actual
fraud. However, a single badge of fraud may stamp a transaction as
fraudulent.3 36
Because the required intent (to "hinder, delay, or defraud") is stated
in the disjunctive, 3 7 it is not a defense that the debtor intended merely to
delay or to hinder seizure of his property." "Hinder" and "delay" have
separate significance for fraudulent transfer purposes. That the debtor be-
lieved that his actions were necessary to allow fortunes to improve is no
defense to an action under the actual fraud theory.3 ' Moreover, it is the
debtor's intent that is relevant under Section 548(a)(1), 4 ° unless the
transferee controls the debtor.3"" Finally, the intent to defraud must have
existed at the time of the transfer.3 42
One source of difficulty with the actual intent to defraud requirement
has been generated by Gleneagles.3 43 In Gleneagles, the court subtly con-
verted actual intent into an objective standard by holding that the lever-
aged buyout at issue was an intentional fraud on creditors because the
parties could reasonably foresee that a diversion of corporate assets, com-
bined with adverse financial conditions, would hinder creditors. 4 The
Third Circuit affirmed. 45 By its nature, intentional fraud is an unpredict-
able standard. Some have argued that the Gleneagles modification of what
has since the Statute of Elizabeth been a subjective inquiry may be prob-
lematic. 46 As the argument goes, it tends to blur the distinction between
actual and constructive fraud. This subtle shift diverted the law's focus
M" Butcher v. Butcher (In re Estate of Reed), 566 P.2d 587, 590 (Wyo. 1977).
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
" See Stratton v. Sioux Falls Paint & Glass (In re Stratton), 23 Bankr. 284, 288 (D.S.D.
1982); see also Vener, supra note 12, at 238 ("it is enough that the intention be merely to delay or to
hinder seizure of a debtor's property").
"" See Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 354 (1932); Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1, 2
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Flushing Say. Bank v. Parr, 81 A.D.2d 655, 667, 438 N.Y.S.2d 374, appeal dis-
missed, 443 N.Y.S.2d 61, 54 N.Y.2d 770, 426 N.E.2d 752 (1981).
340 See Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of Am., Inc.), 24
Bankr. 973, 977-78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). Of course, under § 548(c), the transferee's intent is
relevant to the inquiry of the good faith and value defense.
41 See Pirrone v. Taboroff (In re Vaniman Int'l, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 182 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982).
'1' See Roland v. United States, 838 F.2d 1400, 1402 (5th Cir. 1988); Neubauer v. Cloutier, 265
Minn. 539, 546, 122 N.W.2d 623, 629 (1963) (UFCA case).
3" United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 580-82, affd sub nom. United States
v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
" Id. at 580-83.
s' Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1305.
3'4 See Cieri, Heiman, supra note 56, at 353.
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from the debtor's motive to its knowledge. 4 7 As such, the "new" modifi-
cation is nothing more than the objectification of the intent inquiry, a
method embraced by American courts for some time. 8"
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Each of the three principal fraudulent transfer statutes protects good
faith initial transferees to the extent they give value to the debtor. Like-
wise, subsequent good faith transferees are protected if they give value.
Under the UFTA, notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an
obligation incurred, a good faith transferee or obligee is 'entitled, to the
extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: (i) a
lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; (ii) en-
forcement of any obligation incurred; or (iii) a reduction in the amount of
the liability on the judgment.3 49 This section is an adaptation of Section
548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides in relevant part:
[A] transferee or obligee ... that takes for value and in good faith has a
lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee
gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.350
The protection is limited in that it protects initial transferees only to
the extent they give value to the debtor in good faith. 5 ' However, a sub-
sequent transferee from the initial transferee is protected from fraudulent
transfer liability where the former takes for value, in good faith, and
without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer, 52 or from someone
up the chain of title who acted in good faith and gave value.35 These
limitations must be closely scrutinized in assessing whether a particular
transferee may cloak itself in the savings clauses. 54
Satisfying the good faith element of the various savings clauses can be
problematic because of the subjective nature of the inquiry. 55 At a mini-
347 Id.
US See Denny v. Dana, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 160, 172 (1848) (while fraudulent intent is neces-
sary, every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own acts).
-9 UFTA § 8, 7A U.L.A. 639, 662-63 (1984).
350 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988).
311 See id. But cf. Carlson, supra note 5, at 86-87.
* See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1), (a)(2) (1988).
* See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2) (1988).
'" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(b) (1988); UFTA § 8, 7A U.L.A. 639, 662-63 (1984).
s See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843, 861-62 (D.
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mum, good faith requires (i) a lack of actual knowledge of the insolvency
or inadequate capitalization of the debtor and (ii) a lack of knowledge of
those facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the
adequate financial condition of the debtor.'5 6 The objective component
must be included to make meaningful the requirement of good faith. Pro-
fessor Sherwin further refines the good faith inquiry (although in specific
response to the "fair consideration" requirement as part of a creditor's
prima facie case under the UFCA), modifying its components based on
the type of defendant attempting to employ it.3 57 Bad faith on the part of
an independent lender occurs "only if the lender had actual knowledge of
facts that establish a fraud and failed to make a reasonable judgment that
the transaction met the financial standards set out in fraudulent convey-
ance statutes." ' However, bad faith on the part of buying and selling
shareholders would also occur "if they had notice of the facts from which
the court concludes the transaction was a fraud."3 5 '
Because a buyer is presumed "to know what he is getting," none-
quivalency in values exchanged is evidence of the transferee's lack of good
faith. 6 Moreover, a less than arm's length transaction may negate good
faith. 6 ' The value given need not be reasonably equivalent value 6 ' but,
as to the initial transferee, must be given to the debtor. 63 The absence of
an actual intent to defraud creditors is thus not equivalent to good faith."
Professor Carlson has suggested that the requirement found in Sec-
tion 548(c) that value be given to the debtor should be disregarded. 6
Professor Carlson bases this approach on the fact that the requirement
that value be given to the debtor did not appear in Section 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the UFCA, or in any legislative history of Sec-
tion 548(c). 6 ' Thus, according to Professor Carlson, the language is a
Utah 1987).
356 See Cieri, Heiman, supra note 56, at 368; Bernstein, Leveraged Buyouts: Legal Problems
and Practical Suggestions, in LEVERAGED BuYo"Trs 119, 135-36 (S. Diamond ed. 1985); 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1 548.07, at 548-70 to -79 (15th ed. 1990).
:57 Sherwin, supra note 5, at 521.
." Id.
9" Id.
:go See I G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 294, at 511.
.:1 Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1972).
"2 Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), affd, 40 Bankr.
1007 (D. Conn. 1984).
'3 See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988).
:4 See Carr, 34 Bankr. at 657.
3 1 Carlson, supra note 5, at 86.
349 Id. at 86-87.
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drafting error.36 7 Furthermore, he suggests, as support for his view, the
ability of parties to craft a transaction in such a way as to appear that
value has been given to the debtor in the sense that it received value,
where the value is not, in fact, retained. 68
As a matter of policy, Professor Carlson's view has its merits and
demerits. As a matter of statutory construction, however, he is in error.
The requirement that value be given to the debtor in this situation is not
so absurd as to lead one to the inescapable conclusion that a drafting error
had been made. To the contrary, the directional value requirement has
some support in the history and purpose of fraudulent transfer law. Re-
call that by the time the court reaches the affirmative defense in Section
548(c), it has already concluded that a fraudulent transfer exists.3" 9 Thus,
the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value for the property
transferred while insolvent, an unreasonable exchange at the expense of
its unsecured creditors. Recalling that the essential purpose of fraudulent
transfer law is to prevent the unjust diminution of the estate, one can
easily support the utility of the directional value requirement embodied in
Section 548(c).
Furthermore, Professor Carlson's support for his argument that the
directional value requirement can be circumscribed by clever structuring is
unconvincing. As previously discussed, courts are not constrained by the
formal structure of the transaction where the parties know or should have
known otherwise. If the lender, for example, knows that its funds are
eventually going to the target's former shareholders, then the court will
charge it with that view of the transfer. 7 '
One glitch in the affirmative defenses under the Code is highlighted
by the following example. Suppose Aleph Corp. sold a horse worth
$1,000,000 to Wilbur Post for $750,000. Subsequently, Aleph Corp.
sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Aleph Corp. then
brought a fraudulent transfer action against Wilbur, arguing that the
$750,000 consideration for a horse worth $1,000,000 was a transfer for
which Aleph Corp. received less than reasonably equivalent value while
367 Id. at 86.
3" Id. at 87.
6' Professor Carlson's approach, which would focus solely on the good faith of the initial trans-
feree, does carry with it the utility that the court need not reach the complex and slippery valuation
issue required in § 548(a)(2) unless the court first determines that the defendant acted in bad faith.
See id. at 76. This is, of course, the case with subsequent transferees under the present statutes. E.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
370 See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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insolvent. Aleph Corp. also challenges the transfer as one made with the
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors. At trial, the court
concludes that the horse was worth $1,000,000; that Aleph Corp. was
insolvent at the time of the transfer; that the $750,000 payment was an
exchange for a reasonably equivalent value; and that the debtor, in fact,
possessed the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors when
it made the transfer. The proceedings then turn to the application of any
affirmative defenses.
The applicability and scope of affirmative defenses will turn on
whether the action is based on Section 548 or state law incorporated by
Section 544(b). Section 8(a) of the UFTA, an adaptation of Section 9 of
the UFCA, 7 1 provides that a transferee of an actual intent fraudulent
transfer has an absolute defense if it took the transfer in good faith and
for a reasonably equivalent value.M However, there is no equivalent de-
fense in the Code. Under Section 548(c), a good faith transferee is entitled
to a lien or offset to the extent of the value actually given by the transferee
to the debtor in exchange for the transfer.87M To the extent that reasonably
equivalent value does not equal the value of the asset actually transferred
by the transferee, a good faith transferee of an actual intent fraudulent
transfer is afforded additional prbtection under Section 8(a) of the UFTA
beyond that provided under Section 548(c) of the Code. Consequently, in
our example, under the UFTA or UFCA, Wilbur would have a complete
defense; unfortunately, under the Code, Wilbur would probably have to
return the horse subject to a lien securing $750,000.
Finally, under Section 550(d)(1), a good faith transferee possesses a
meager lien on the property recovered by the trustee under Section 548(a)
to secure the lesser of the cost of any improvement made and any increase
in value of the property as a result of the improvement." 4 This provision
is intended to protect the good faith transferee's reliance on the transfer as
lawful. 7 1
171 See UFCA § 9, 7A U.L.A. 427, 577-78 (1918).
' ' See UFTA § 8(a), Comment 1, 7A U.L.A. 639, 662-63 (1984).
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988).
, Section 550(d)(1) is a more limited defense than § 548(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)(1) (1988).
a' The question of whether the transferee of a fraudulent transfer attacked by the trustee under
state law through § 544(b) can be saddled with the limited defense under § 550 or can avail itself of
the liberal defenses under the UFTA takes on singular importance. A transferee who is attacked
under § 544(b) as the recipient of a fraudulent transfer under state law cannot resort to the liberal
protection under § 548(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988). However, the cases are divided over
whether the transferee must find its only solace under § 550 or can turn for relief to the affirmative
defenses provided in the UFTA. Compare Osage Crude Oil Purchasing, Inc. v. Osage Oil & Transp.,
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It is under the notion of affirmative defenses that one discerns the
third-order limitations that properly confine fraudulent transfer law. As
previously discussed, a good faith initial transferee who gives value is pro-
tected to the extent of the value actually given to the debtor. Moreover,
any subsequent good faith transferees who give value are completely pro-
tected. Furthermore, improvements by a good faith transferee receive a
limited form of protection.
Additionally, there is a distinct group of situations on which fraudu-
lent transfer law was never intended to tread. Section 10 of the UFTA
provides:
Unless displaced by the provisions of this [Act], the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and
agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its
provisions.17 8
The UFCA, in Section 11, also contains a supplementary provision.S77
Moreover, Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code has been interpreted to
endow the bankruptcy courts with the powers of a court of equity. 78
Consequently, an historical perusal of the cases involving defenses like
those identified in Section 10 of the UFTA should help delineate the
third-order limitations of fraudulent transfer law, limitations that protect
certain transferees even though they may not neatly fit within a specific
savings statute.
Like today, the situation of a subsequent creditor (a creditor whose
relationship arises after the transfer) who complains of a fraudulent trans-
fer was problematic at common law. Professor Glenn noted in his treatise
that at common law, as a matter of certainty in pleading, "the subsequent
creditor who complains of a fraudulent conveyance should state the cir-
cumstances under which he extended credit, so as to show that, if he did
so after the transfer was made, he was not aware of the fact at the time...
,,37 Implicitly embodied in Professor Glenn's cautionary note are the eq-
uitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Because the creditor's right
Inc. (In re Osage Crude Oil Purchasing, Inc.), 103 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989) with Web-
ster v. Barbara (In re Otis & Edwards, P.C.), 115 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990).
376 UFTA § 10, 7A U.L.A. 639, 666 (1984).
377 UFCA § 11, 7A U.L.A. 427, 634 (1918).
78 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); see, e.g., In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98 (3d
Cir. 1989).
379 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 76, at 129.
[Vol. 8
Fraudulent Transfer Law
under fraudulent transfer law was a right to act to have the court adjudi-
cate the transfer as void, a creditor could ratify the transaction both ex-
pressly or by conduct. 8 ' Once the creditor affirmed or ratified the trans-
action with full knowledge of the facts, any subsequent action based on
disaffirmance was barred. 8"
The doctrines of waiver and estoppel rest upon the fundamental
principle that, as between the debtor and its transferee, the transfer is
valid and enforceable. 82 This result is embodied in the concept of
voidability as opposed to voidness. Professor Glenn noted the situation of
a creditor who notifies a third party that his principal's transaction is
fraudulent. 83 In those circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the
creditor to act immediately, by attachment or injunction. "[A] creditor
who delays should not complain if the third party honours his obligation
after waiting a reasonable time upon the demanding creditor."3 84
Since its inception, fraudulent transfer law has recognized that it was
possible for the debtor's transfer to injure subsequent creditors. 85 Never-
theless, not all subsequent creditors fell within the law's protective ambit.
As Professor Glenn pithily noted, a creditor extends credit based on what
the debtor presently has, not on what the debtor once had. 86
Hence the court has a duty, in the case of a subsequent creditor, that is
quite different from the task which arises when the complaining creditor
holds a claim which preceded the conveyance. The court must now find
some connection between the act of the debtor and the liability which subse-
quently accrued, something to justify the statement that the debtor's convey-
ance was intended to injure the subsequent creditor. This justifying circum-
stance should lead to an inference of fact, and the question basically is one
"o Id. § 113, at 223.
:$ Id. (citing Robins v. Wooten, 128 Ala. 373, 30 So. 681 (1900)).
's Id. § 114, at 225. The fraudulent transfer conveys both legal and equitable title to the trans-
feree. See Lawson v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 18 Bankr. 384 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Although the
transferor of a fraudulent transfer cannot revoke the transfer, an executory contract for purposes of
defrauding creditors is void. See Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 177 P.2d 4
(1947).
Can a debtor purge the taint associated with a fraudulent transfer? In Carman v. Athearn, 77
Cal. App. 2d 585, 175 P.2d 926 (1947), the court concluded that where a debtor, after transferring
property to defraud his creditors, purges the fraudulent conduct by paying his creditors in full, the
debtor is entitled to a reconveyance and the clean hands doctrine has no application. Carman, 175
P.2d at 933-34.
" 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 125, at 240.
884 Id.
" Id. § 317, at 555.




Professor Glenn then embellishes this observation with the following
example:
Thus, a debtor sells a piece of property and pays all his debts with part of
the proceeds. At that moment, then, it is nobody's concern what he does
with the balance. He may keep it, or he may give it away, and no one can
gainsay him unless there is a specific equity arising from trust, contract or
fraud. Later the party contracts new debts, but the proceeds of his activities
are so squandered that the time arrives when this person, once a man of
substance, is insolvent. But for a new creditor to ask the court to extend its
process to gifts that were made when there were no creditors, is to invoke
the rule of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. There is no such general rule under
the statutes of fraudulent conveyances, any more than there is such a gener-
alization in logic. Unless, then, there is more than the events, in order of
time, of gift first, debts later, the subsequent creditor has no grievance. In
all cases there must be more than mere time.38 8
Therefore, one can deduce from a perusal of cases, 89 Section 11 of the
UFCA, Section 10 of the UFTA,"90 and Section 105 of the Code that the
inability of certain subsequent creditors to attack a transfer as fraudulent
is still part of the fabric of modern fraudulent transfer law.
In Kupetz v. Wolf,3 91 the Ninth Circuit upheld the sale of a business
that had been financed through a leveraged buyout against attack as a
fraudulent transfer. 92 In concluding that no fraudulent transfer existed,
the court relied on, among other considerations, the fact that the trustee in
bankruptcy represented no creditors whose claims arose prior to the date
of the leveraged buyout and who did not have an opportunity to evaluate
the effect of the leveraged buyout before entering into a credit
relationship."'
387 Id. § 319, at 556-57.
313 Id. § 319, at 557.
311 See, e.g., Brill v. W.B. Foshay Co., 65 F.2d 420 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 643
(1933); In re Central Metallic Casket Co., 170 F. Supp. 320 (D. Wis. 1959), aff d, 273 F.2d 506
(7th Cir. 1960); Cooch v. Grier, 30 Del. Ch. 255, 59 A.2d 282 (1948); Davison v. Charpentier, 72
N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1946), affid, 72 N.Y.S.2d 296, 272 A.D. 825 (App. Div. 1947).
390 See UFTA, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 639, 642 (1984) ("The Act recognizes that laches and
estoppel may operate to preclude a particular creditor from pursuing a remedy against a fraudulent
transfer or obligation even though the statutory period of limitations has not run." (emphasis added)).
391 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
392 Id. at 843.
393 Id. at 848-50.
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In Credit Managers Association v. Federal Co.,394 the district court
held that a leveraged buyout by existing management of a corporation was
not a fraudulent transfer under California's version of the UFCA.s ' Spe-
cifically, after having found that there was no fair consideration for the
obligation incurred by the former parent owner of the corporation, the
court did find that the corporation was not left with unreasonably small
capital at the time of the transfer. 96 More importantly for our purposes,
even if the leveraged buyout was a fraud on creditors, the court was ap-
parently ready to conclude that the creditors challenging the transaction
must be creditors who held claims at or before the time of the transfer.
The court observed that many of the corporation's creditors at the time
the transaction was challenged had become creditors after the transfer and
much of the corporation's outstanding debt was incurred after the lever-
aged buyout.
These creditors made a post-buyout decision to extend credit on new terms
to a new entity .... As the creditors' plaintiff represents [sic] did not have
any substantial stake in Crescent at the time of the buyout, there does not
appear to be a strong reason to give these creditors the right to attack the
buyout as harmful to them. It would seem that if leveraged buyouts are to
be susceptible to attack on fraudulent conveyance grounds, only those who
were creditors at the time of the transaction should have a right to attack
the transaction.3 97
The court did not specifically decide the estoppel issue because neither
party raised it.39
8
Nonetheless, several commentators have argued that the doctrines of
estoppel and waiver cannot preclude a subsequent creditor from bringing
a fraudulent transfer action because, under UFCA Section 5 and UFTA
Section 4, a subsequent creditor is granted standing to bring such an ac-
tion. 99 Unfortunately, these commentators are confusing two separate and
" 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
"' Id. at 188.
I" ld. at 183, 187.
37 Id. at 180; see also Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91
Bankr. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (constructive fraud provision may only be used to protect credi-
tors existing at the time of the transfer).
" Id. at 181.
'" See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 5, at 119. Professor Carlson is incorrect when he states that
"the Credit Managers court is off base in introducing assumption of the risk [estoppel and waiver?]
into fraudulent conveyance law." Id. It did not; the estoppel and waiver doctrines were a part of the
fabric of fraudulent transfer law well before the Credit Managers case. Moreover, Professor Carlson's
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distinct concepts. The doctrine of standing determines the universe of par-
ties that can properly bring an action in the first instance. Assuming that
a particular party can bring the action, the doctrines of estoppel and
waiver help shrink the universe to those who can properly maintain the
action. The doctrine of standing and the doctrines of estoppel and waiver
are not congruous.
To say, however, that all subsequent creditors are unable to maintain
a fraudulent transfer action is a gross misstatement of the law. Even
before the UFCA, it appears that the law distinguished between consen-
sual and nonconsensual creditors.4 00 The doctrines of waiver and estoppel
require that the party against whom the doctrines are to apply step for-
ward with full knowledge of the situation.40 Equity does not cry foul
when a party, with full knowledge of the transaction, enters into a new
creditor relationship with the debtor. To permit otherwise would trans-
form the debtor and transferees into underwriters of the creditor's invest-
ment." This is, of course, not the case with the nonconsensual subse-
quent creditor. This person did not have the luxury of choosing his
debtor. Here, one is usually talking about tort claimants and the taxing
authorities. These creditors did not choose to deal with their debtor at all,
let alone after a full disclosure of all relevant facts. Consequently, the
doctrines of estoppel and waiver do not serve as substantive limitations in
this situation. 03
V. REMEDIES
A proper analysis of the trustee's remedies under the Bankruptcy
Code requires consideration of Sections 544(b), 548, 550, and 551. Sec-
tions 544(b) and 548 grant the trustee the power to avoid the transfer. 4
view does not do justice to § 11 of the UFCA and § 10 of the UFTA.
0 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, §§ 329-40.
40' See Davison v. Charpentier, 72 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1946), affd, 72 N.Y.S.2d 296, 272
A.D. 825 (App. Div. 1947). See generally 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §§ 61, 72 (1964).
40' But see Rubenstein, A Practical Guide to Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged Buyouts,
FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REV., Summer 1990, at 20, 25. Mr. Rubenstein asserts that fraud-
ulent transfer law is not an insurance policy against business downturn but a policy against fraud. Id.
Although the point is well-taken, Mr. Rubenstein also confuses the concepts of standing and estoppel.
It is one thing to say that Creditor A has standing to bring the action. It is yet another thing entirely
to conclude that Creditor A can maintain the action. To allow Creditor A to do so in all situations
where the constructive fraud elements are met would render § 11 of the UFCA and § 10 of the
UFTA meaningless.
403 See generally 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, §§ 327-40.
4- See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (1988).
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Section 551 provides that any transfer avoided under Sections 548 or
544(b) is automatically preserved for the benefit of the estate but only
with respect to property of the estate.4 " Section 550 provides:
[T]he trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property trans-
ferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose bene-
fit such transfer was made;406 or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.407
In the words of one court, "Section 550(a) is the operative arm for
reaching property or the value of property that is the subject of an avoided
fraudulent transfer. ' 40 8 Although there usually are a number of target
transferees, the trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction from the
initial transferee or a subsequent transferee.40 9 Moreover, the recovery
provision is tempered by the protection against liability to transferees of
avoided fraudulent transfers under Sections 548(c) and 550(a) and (d).
In Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communi-
cations NC, Inc. ),410 the court held that the general rule was that the
fraudulently transferred property itself should be returned to the estate in
order to avoid unnecessary contests over valuation. 41' Thus, the remedy is
4o See 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988); see, e.g., Retail Clerks Welfare Trust v. McCarty (In re Van
De Kamp's Dutch Bakeries), 908 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1990).
'" Thus, an entity for whose benefit a transfer is made is liable regardless of the fact that the
entity may have never actually received the property.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
4" In re Gingery, 48 Bankr. 1000, 1003 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
4" See 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1988); see also Pereira v. Kaiser (In re Big Apple Scenic Studio,
Inc.), 63 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (trustee could not recover transfers from debtor's princi-
pal, who was transferor not transferee). For a discussion concerning the recoverability of rents from
fraudulently transferred property, see Annotation, Accountability and Liability for Rents and Profits
of Grantee of Fraudulently Conveyed Real Property, 60 A.L.R.2d 593 (1958).
An interesting question arises as to whether a defendant in a § 548 or § 544(b) action has a right
to contribution. In Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 Bankr. 162 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court
answered no, finding no explicit statutory grant of a contribution right and no implied cause of action
under the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Wieboldt Stores, 111
Bankr. at 167-68. The result seems harsh. It allows a debtor in possession to favor selectively certain
transferees at the expense of other, often times, more culpable transferees. The possible abuses, espe-
cially in the leveraged buyout situation, with the fraudulent transfer plaintiff often being the debtor in
possession, are mind-boggling.
410 75 Bankr. 619 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir.
1990).
"" Id. at 629.
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generally a prescription for rescission, an equitable tool.412 "One conse-
quence of this rule is that the estate normally receives the value of any
appreciation in the property's value from the date of transfer at least
where the increase is caused by market factors." 41 However, where the
property has depreciated in value, courts are likely to hold its return to be
inappropriate."1" "Any relief other than entry of a money judgment" for
the property's value as of the date of transfer would fail to make the estate
whole and "would encourage transferees to resist recovery as long as pos-
sible in order to maximize what would amount to free rent."415 From a
perusal of the cases, it appears that the measure of damages for a money
judgment is the fair market value of the property at the time of the trans-
fer.41 6 Furthermore, while it appears that prejudgment interest and puni-
tive damages may be awardable in appropriate circumstances, it does not
appear that attorneys' fees are recoverable.4 1 7
Some courts construe Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide
a grant of equitable jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts confined by the
constraints of their non-article III role. 418 With this in mind, one may ask
whether the remedies under Sections 548, 550, and 551 are exhaustive or
whether, under Section 105, the trustee may seek to employ an equitable
remedy in aid of its action under Section 548. Although the law is unclear
in this area, the better view is that to- the extent the equitable remedy is
not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code, a court exercising its powers
under Section 105 should recognize the equitable remedy.
Under the UFTA, a party challenging the transfer has a host of rem-
edies available, including: (i) "avoidance of the transfer or obligation to
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim"; (ii) "an attachment or
other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of
the transferee"; (iii) "an injunction against further disposition by the
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other prop-
erty"; (iv) "appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset trans-
ferred or of other property of the transferee"; (v) "any other relief the
circumstances may require," possibly including the imposition of a con-
412 Smyser, supra note 7, at 816.
413 IA BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 5D:106, at 79 (1990).
414 See, e.g., Hall v. Arthur Young and Co. (In re Computer Universe, Inc.), 58 Bankr. 28
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
415 Id. at 32.
41" See, e.g., Joing v. 0 & P Partnership (In re Joing), 82 Bankr. 495 (D. Minn. 1987).
417 See 1A BANKR. SERV. L. ED. §§ 5D:107 - :109, at 80-81 (1990).




structive trust, an injunction, or declaratory relief; (vi) "[i]f a creditor has
obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the
court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its pro-
ceeds."419 This judgment may be entered against (a) the first transferee of
the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or (b) any
subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who took for
value or from any subsequent transferee.420
The courts disagree regarding the appropriate remedies where a
trustee is successful in bringing an action under Section 544(b). The sec-
tion itself is federal law; therefore, a number of courts conclude that al-
though the trustee's cause of action is based on state law (here the
UFTA), the trustee's remedies are identified by reference to Sections 550
and 551. Because of the substantial similarity between the remedies under
state (UFTA) and bankruptcy law, this may be more an academic issue
than a practical one.421
A fair reading of the "mere conduit" cases supports the overt recog-
nition of this fourth-order limitation making only a true transferee liable.
In Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel, Inc.),"" the
court recognized a continuing trend suggesting that financial institutions
will not be subject to liability if they have simply channeled payments
from a debtor to a third party, that is, acted as mere conduits.42 In Kai-
ser Steel, the district court held that a brokerage firm, which had received
funds for its clients in a stock redemption transaction as a part of a lever-
aged buyout, was a "mere conduit" and not a transferee of a fraudulent
transfer for purpose of Section 550.424
In Kaiser Steel, Charles Schwab & Co. held stock for its customers'
accounts in a street name through the system established in connection
with the securities clearing process.42 Schwab was not in the business of
buying and selling stock for its own account, but rather acted for its cus-
tomers with regard to their stock transactions.42 In conjunction with the
leveraged buyout of Kaiser's common shareholders, Schwab received cash
and shares of preferred stock on behalf of its customers, which were
411 UFTA § 7, 7A U.L.A. 639, 660 (1984).
410 UFTA § 8, 7A U.L.A. at 662-63.
411 This, unfortunately, may not be the case with remedies provided for by the UFCA.
422 110 Bankr. 514 (D. Colo.), affd, 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
412 Id. at 519 (citing Lowry v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Columbia Data Prods.,
Inc.), 892 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1989)).
424 Id. at 521.
,"5 Id. at 519.
46 Id. at 517.
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tendering their common shares to Kaiser. 2 After bankruptcy, Kaiser
sought to recover from several parties, including Schwab, under Section
548.428
Schwab argued that it was not liable under the fraudulent transfer
laws because it was not an initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer.
Applying agency principles, however, the bankruptcy court found that
Schwab was acting as an undisclosed agent on behalf of its customers and,
thus, might be deemed an initial transferee under Section 550.429
On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's holding,
concluding that the bankruptcy court should have applied the control test
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. Eu-
ropean American Bank,"" to determine whether Schwab was a transferee
or a mere conduit of the leveraged buyout consideration. 1 Under the
control test adopted by the Seventh Circuit, "the minimum requirement of
status as a 'transferee' is dominion over the money or other asset, the right
[not the mere naked power] to put the money to one's own purposes."432
As a result, Schwab could not be deemed a transferee:
Schwab never held a beneficial interest in any Kaiser stock, received no
consideration for facilitating the conversion of its customers' stock, and had
no ability to control the disposition of funds paid to its customers in the
merger. It was simply a financial intermediary, not a 'transferee.'4 8
Kaiser adds further support to the conduit liability theory adopted by
courts to protect innocent intermediaries that have no beneficial interest
in, or control over, transferred property from exposure to fraudulent
transfer actions. Based on the Kaiser court's analysis, intermediaries
should be protected from fraudulent transfer liability provided that they
limit their control over or interest in funds.434
Although neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates
under what circumstances the court should order a transferee to pay the
value of the transferred property rather than to return the transferred
427 Id.
410 Id. at 516.
419 Id. at 518-19.
410 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
411 Kaiser Steel, 110 Bankr. at 520.
412 Bonded Fin. Serws., 838 F.2d at 893.
4" Kaiser Steel, 110 Bankr. at 521.
43 See Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200
(11th Cir. 1988); Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
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property itself, one court has concluded that Section 550(a) expresses a
congressional intent that a transferee should return the property trans-
ferred unless to do so would be inequitable, in which event he must pay
the property's value.43 5 Although one court has stated that Section 550(a)
means that "[ilt is simply within the court's discretion to determine
whether a return of the value of property or return of the actual property
is the appropriate remedy,"43" the general rule favors the return of the
fraudulently transferred property to the estate to avoid unnecessary con-
tests over valuation.43 7 Furthermore, one commentator explains that
"[o]ne consequence of this rule is that the estate normally receives the
value of any appreciation in the property's value from the date of transfer
at least where the increase is caused by market factors."43
When the property, which is the subject of an avoided fraudulent
transfer, has depreciated in value because of market factors or use by the
transferee, a court should not return the property itself.4 9 Only a money
judgment for the property's value would make the estate whole and dis-
courage transferees from resisting "recovery as long as possible in order to
maximize [what would amount to] free rent."44 0 Similarly, when the
transferee no longer has the property transferred, a money judgment for
the value of the property should be entered. 1 In Ferrari v. Computer
Associates International, Inc. (In re First Software Corp.),4 42 inventory
held by the transferee declined by almost $1.5 million in value as a conse-
quence of on-going product revisions and improvements. The court re-
fused to order the return of the inventory and instead ordered recovery of
its value at the time of the transfer. 4
4" General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 Bankr. 124, 135 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987) (citing Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC,
Inc.), 75 Bankr. 619, 629 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir.
1990)); see Armstrong v. Vedaa (In re Vedaa), 49 Bankr. 409, 411 (Bankr. N.D. 1985).
"' First Software Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. (In re First Software Corp.), 107 Bankr.
417, 423 (D. Mass. 1989).
"" Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 75 Bankr.
619, 629 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990).
1 lA BANKR. Ssv. L. ED. § 5D:106, at 79 (1990).
"s Hall v. Arthur Young and Co. (In re Computer Universe, Inc.), 58 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986).
41 Id. at 32.
44 Williams v. Kidder Skis Int'l (In re Fitzpatrick), 73 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.), affd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 60 Bankr. 808 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
44 84 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), affid, 107 Bankr. 417 (D. Mass. 1989).
443 Id. at 286; see also Brown v. Borchers & Heimsoth Constr. Co. (In re Apollo Hollow Metal
and Hardware Co.), 71 Bankr. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (court would not allow defendant
to return remaining inventory in full satisfaction of its liability to debtor where a defendant had used
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Under present case law, a court will order money damages, and not
the return of property, where the property cannot be returned. 4 For ex-
ample, where the present holder of the property is protected as a good
faith transferee for value, any prior transferee may be liable for money
damages; nevertheless, the court could not award a return of property and
disadvantage the good faith transferee.
Although one can advance the argument that courts should award
damages in lieu of the property because so much has been done to the
transferred property, such as additions and improvements, that the char-
acter of the property transferred is no longer even remotely similar to the
property as it presently exists, the courts have uniformly refused to recog-
nize the equities on the side of the transferee.4 45 The courts have 'elegated
the transferee to his protections under Section 548(c) to a lien in the re-
turned property to the extent he gave value to the debtor plus an addi-
tional lien in the property up to the cost of any improvements in the prop-
erty or the market value increase due to those improvements, whichever is
less, under Section 550(d).446
After a perusal of the fraudulent transfer cases analyzing appropriate
remedies, one is led to the inescapable conclusion that, to use the words of
Professors Baird and Jackson, the remedy is "needlessly crude. 44"7 In
their haste to do what is in the best interest of the estate, courts have
forgotten that the remedy should be, as stated by Professor Smyser, "an
equitable one designed to place the parties to the transfer in the position
they would have occupied had the improper transfer not occurred."'4" No
where is the remark of Professors Baird and Jackson more accentuated
than in regard to the law on the time to fix the value of the transferred
property if the court orders a monetary award rather than a return of the
property.
Section 550(a) provides that a court may order recovery of the value
of transferred property, but does not indicate at what time value is to be
determined. 4" Although most cases either assume or hold that value is
and consumed portions of the debtor's former inventory); Computer Universe, 58 Bankr. at 32 (court
ruled that plaintiff could not be made whole by return of depreciated computer equipment and, there-
fore, ordered defendant to pay money damages).
444 See 1A BANXR. Sa.Rv. L. ED. § 5D:106, at 80 (1990).
445 See, e.g., Coleman v. Graff, 94 N.J. Eq. 223, 119 A. 280 (1922).
44" See 1A BANKR. SERv. L. ED. § 58:69, at 66 (1990); 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(d) (1988).
4,7 Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 843.
445 Smyser, supra note 7, at 821.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988); see Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Com-
munications NC, Inc.), 75 Bankr. 619, 629 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 914
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determined at the time the transfer was made,45° in In re Computer Uni-
verse, Inc.,"' the court held that the date of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition was the measuring date in determining the value to be awarded
under Section 550(a). 452 Moreover, in Morris Communications,45 the
bankruptcy court ordered the return of stock which, although worth
$50,000 at the time of its transfer according to the bankruptcy court, was
worth $280,000 at the time of its recovery at trial.454 As one commentator
has noted, "no case has yet gone so far in pursuing the benefit of the
estate that it has used a date subsequent to the latter of the petition or the
transfer date in determining the value of property subject to recovery, but
there is no logical bar to the use of a date of recovery." 455 Consequently, if
the property in Morris Communications had not been recoverable, it
would appear at least plausible that the court would have awarded a
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $280,000, the value of the
assets at trial.456
Unfortunately, in their quest for acting in the best interest of the
estate, courts are forgetting the basic tenet of fraudulent transfer law and
the fact that there exists ample authority to temper a fraudulent transfer
remedy by equitable principles. Fraudulent transfer law is a debt-collec-
tion device whose sole purpose is to prevent the unjust diminution of the
debtor's estate. It is at this stage, the assessment of an appropriate and
equitable remedy, that one uncovers another fourth-order limitation.
Traditionally, courts, including bankruptcy courts, possessed the
power to ensure that the fraudulent transfer remedy produced an equita-
ble result.457
Fraudulent conveyance statutes have traditionally invalidated fraudulent
transfers only to the extent necessary to remedy the injury. Fraudulent
F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Martin, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR, Aug. 1990, at 7-8
("The courts do not uniformly agree upon the timing of the 'value' assessment.").
'I" See In re First Software Corp., 107 Bankr. 417, 423 (D. Mass. 1989); Official Creditors
Comm. v. Agri Dairy Prods., Inc. (In re James B. Downing & Co.), 74 Bankr. 906, 911 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987); Derryberry v. Albers (In re Albers), 67 Bankr. 530, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986);
Craig v. Pueblo Corp. (In re Crabtree), 49 Bankr. 806, 811 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
45 58 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1986).
s Id. at 32.
'5 75 Bankr. 619 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir.
1990).
"4 Id. at 629.
... Martin, supra note 449, at 8.
456 Id.
457 See Smyser, supra note 7, at 822.
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transfers are voidable at the insistence and for the benefit of the grantor's
creditors. They are not void as between grantor and grantee. Thus, invali-
dation of a fraudulent conveyance for the benefit of creditors does not re-
scind the transfer insofar as the parties to the conveyance are concerned. As
between the grantor and grantee, the grantee retains his interest in the
transferred property. Where the fraudulently transferred property is sold to
satisfy the claims of the defrauded creditors, it is the grantee who retains
the equitable right of redemption and in the event there is any surplus
remaining from the proceeds of the sale after satisfying the creditors' claims
it belongs to the grantee.458
In assessing the damage award under Section 550(a), courts have em-
braced the language in Section 551, which states that the transfer avoided
is automatically preserved for the benefit of the estate.459 Seizing on the
"benefit of the estate" language, the courts generally award a return of
the property, where there has been depreciation, or, as in Computer Uni-
verse, a money judgment equal to the value of the property at the time of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.4 6 ° Keeping in mind that the determi-
nation of value for all other purposes is made at the time of the transfer,
one is hard-pressed to justify using a different measuring date for the
damages awarded. Based on equitable principles and the purposes behind
fraudulent transfer law, one can deduce a fourth-order limitation to the
application of fraudulent transfer law to modern transactions-a truly eq-
uitable remedy. If the property transferred depreciates in value, the debtor
may recover money damages equal to the value of the property at the time
of the transfer. Why? Because it is an equitable result. But equity is a
two-way street. If the property appreciates in value, the truly equitable
remedy may also be a money judgment equal to the value of the property
at the time of the transfer and not the return of the property. The follow-
ing examples are provided to demonstrate this point.
First, take a simple example. The debtor transfers to Andy Taylor a
guitar worth $100 for $50. Andy pays the $50 in good faith. Subse-
quently, the debtor files a bankruptcy petition and seeks to avoid the sale
as a constructive fraudulent transfer. At trial, the court concludes that not
only was the debtor insolvent at the time of the transfer, but that the $50
payment by Andy was an amount less than reasonably equivalent in
value. Now, the court must decide what remedy to fashion. Under Section
458 Id. at 822 & nn.127-130 (footnotes omitted).




550(a), it may order Andy to return the guitar to the debtor, granting
Andy a lien on the guitar for $50, or it may order Andy to pay the debtor
an additional amount up to $50, representing the difference in the value
given and the value of the guitar at the time of the sale. Suppose Andy
has become attached to the guitar and wants to keep it. Also suppose that
the court is persuaded by the equities of the situation and allows Andy to
keep the guitar if Andy pays $50. Andy agrees to do so. At this point in
time, the creditors of the debtor have no complaint. At the time of the
original sale, an asset worth $100 was transferred for $50 to Andy, un-
justly enriching Andy at the expense of the creditors. Requiring Andy to
pay $50 (the difference between what Andy actually paid in good faith
and what the guitar was worth at the time of the transfer) addresses the
specific harm caused by the transfer. Thus, what Andy has risked, even
though he has acted in good faith, is the possibility of being subsequently
assessed a fraudulent transfer tax by a court. The amount of the tax is
determined by deducting the amount of the value given to the debtor in
good faith from the amount of the value of the asset transferred at the
time of the transfer.
Assume the same facts as above, but instead of the value of the guitar
staying unchanged from the date of the transfer to the time of trial, as-
sume that at the time the petition was filed the guitar was worth only
$50. The result should be the same. That is, the fraudulent transfer tax to
be paid by Andy is still $50. This is true even under the present fraudu-
lent transfer remedy scheme. When property depreciates in value after the
transfer, the general rule is that the court orders a money judgment based
on the value of the property at the time of the transfer, recognizing any
good faith lien the transferee may have.
Now, let us assume the same facts as above, with one key variation.
Andy has decided to give up his position as sheriff of Mayberry and has,
instead, changed his name to Hershel Zimmerman and has taken up the
task of becoming a folk singer. Hershel is gifted and begins to sell millions
of records. He begins to acquire a myriad of loyal and die-hard fans. Fan
clubs spring up all over the nation. Anything he touches becomes a valua-
ble collector's item to his devoted fans. His guitar, the one he purchased
for $50 three years ago, is now worth $50,000. Outside of a $5 pick guard
and a new set of strings, he has made no improvements to the guitar. The
court must now fashion an equitable remedy. What should it be?
Under the general rule, the court would order Hershel to return the
guitar to the debtor's estate, even though that at the time of the transfer
the guitar was purchased by Hershel in good faith for $50 and was worth
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$100. Of course, under Section 548(c), Hershel would be entitled to a lien
against the guitar for $50 and, under Section 550(d), would be entitled to
a lien to the extent of the improvements made here. Considering that the
guitar was worth $50,000 at the time the petition was filed, the protec-
tions afforded by the Code are meager. Nevertheless, courts would justify
this harsh and inequitable result (remember Hershel has acted in good
faith all along) by resorting to a strained reading of Section 551. The
courts have read Section 551 as a directive to fashion a remedy that is in
the best interest of the estate. Section 551 is not a measure of damages or
a crutch to justify inequitable results; rather, the section states for whose
benefit-the benefit of the estate-the judgment is to be awarded.
The resolution (and inequity) of the last example is clear once one
recognizes the purposes of fraudulent transfer law and the fact that any
remedy must be tempered by equity. The purposes of fraudulent transfer
law is to prevent the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate at the ex-
pense of general creditors. The guitar was worth $100 when it was trans-
ferred. From a creditor's perspective, that fact means that if a general
creditor proceeded to judgment and executed on the guitar, he would have
received up to $100 or his claim, whichever was less. At the time of the
transfer, the guitar was not worth $50,000. The debtor's estate was not
diminished by $50,000, but by $100, the value of the guitar at the time of
the transfer. Under the facts of this example, Hershel should be able to
keep the guitar by paying a $50 fraudulent transfer tax. To order a re-
turn of the guitar or worse yet, to order Hershel to pay $49,950 because
the guitar may now be in the hands of one of his loyal fans is outrageous.
Granted, the result is in the best interests of the estate, but so is failing to
recognize any defenses under Sections 548(c), 550(a), and 550(d). At what
point does one stop ignoring time-honored principles of equity under the
rubric of what one is doing is in the best interests of the estate?
CONCLUSION
Greek legend tells of the greatest of Athenian heroes, Theseus, the
son of King Aegeus. Like other mythological heroes, Theseus was very
powerful. But unlike his contemporary, Hercules, the strongest and most
powerful of the heroes, Theseus' power was tempered with keen senses of
equity and reason.
The common threads running through the exploits of Hercules are
raw, unmeasured power and the wielding of that power without disci-
pline. Not so with Theseus. Certainly, Theseus possessed great power: he
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rid the road to Athens of the treacherous bandits who preyed on trav-
elers-Sciron, Sinis, and Procrustes; he successfully navigated the laby-
rinth, dealing a lethal blow to the Minotaur; and, of course, he was one of
the men who sailed on the Argo to find the Golden Fleece. But Theseus'
attributes, unlike Hercules, did not end there. When all others shunned
Hercules after he killed his entire family in a crazed rage induced by the
gods, Theseus stepped forward to embrace his friend, rejecting the idea
that a man could be guilty of murder when he had not known what he
was doing.
Unfortunately, the application of modern fraudulent transfer law
more closely resembles the unfettered power of Hercules, rather than the
reasoned power of Theseus. The fraudulent transfer power is a powerful
avoidance tool that can legitimately extinguish state law entitlements such
as ownership of a certain asset. Courts, not unlike Hercules, are wielding
the powers of fraudulent transfer law without any meaningful limitations,
other than the rhythmic refrain that whatever result is achieved is in the
best interests of the estate. Unfortunately, the over-worn adage is often
blinding, leading the courts to overlook or ignore the statutory and com-
mon law limits to the application of fraudulent transfer law. Ignoring the
doctrines of estoppel and waiver may be in the best interests of the estate;
so, too, may be ignoring all affirmative defenses. Both approaches are
wrong.
In their seminal article on fraudulent transfer liability, Professors
Baird and Jackson would categorically exempt many leveraged transac-
tions from liability.46 They contend that creditors should have no more
rights concerning a leveraged buyout that precedes a debtor's collapse than
they do with respect to any other business transaction that turns out
poorly.462 But as the court in Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In
re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.)4 63 observed:
[A] transaction which at the outset gives the debtor no value and leaves it
insolvent or with unreasonably small capital is quite different from one
which merely turns out poorly in the end. The Baird and Jackson argu-
ments are unconvincing in both their logic and their inconsistency with the
express wording of the fraudulent transfer statutes. Most courts have re-
jected them.464
441 Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 831-34.
442 Id.
"$ 100 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
4" Id. at 134-35 (and cases cited therein).
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It is one thing to say that fraudulent transfer law applies to modern
commercial transactions like leveraged buyouts. It is quite another thing
to say that the applicability of fraudulent transfer law is without limita-
tions. In our quest to understand fraudulent transfer liability, we often
overlook its first principles. At its core, fraudulent transfer law is a debt-
collection device and not a revenue-generating tool; its mission is to pre-
vent the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate. But to say that these first
principles are without limitation is to perpetuate a grave injustice to the
vibrant and colorful history of fraudulent transfer law. In her article, Pro-
fessor Smyser implores us not to forget the inherent limitations to the ap-
plicability of fraudulent transfer laws embodied in the causes of action
themselves-the requirements of insolvency and a failure of reasonably
equivalent value at the time of the transfer. I have labelled these the first-
order limitations. Nor should we forget the second-order limitations em-
bodied in the anatomy of the transfer under scrutiny. Wieboldt, Kupetz,
and Tabor Court Realty teach us that where the parties' knowledge and
intent diverge from the formal structure employed, we are to choose the
former road in our travels. Furthermore, we must recognize the impres-
sive efforts by Professors Carlson and Sherwin, along with Professor
Glenn's monumental work, in articulating a workable standard regarding
the statutory affirmative defenses. These saving statutes, coupled with the
recognition and ability to assert equitable defenses such as waiver and
estoppel, make up the third-order limitations. And last, the limitations on
who is liable for a fraudulent transfer and at what price make up the
fourth-order limitations.
Fraudulent transfer law is a scepter to some, a bauble to others. It is
a multi-dimensional, complex body of law. To say what it is paints only
half the picture. To say what it is not, to detail its limitations, allows one
to properly focus on the nebulous contours of modern fraudulent transfer
law. To say that a fraudulent transfer is a transfer made at the time the
debtor is insolvent in exchange for something of less than reasonably
equivalent value is no more helpful than to say an avoidable preference is
a transfer that satisfies all of the elements of Section 547(b).4"" Such gen-
eralizations cannot help but be misleading. Just because all the elements
of an avoidable preference under Section 547(b) are satisfied does not nec-
essarily doom the transfer. To the contrary, even with the satisfaction of
all the elements under Section 547(b), the defendant may nevertheless de-
feat the trustee's attempt at avoidance by proving an affirmative defense.
4e5 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
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These affirmative defenses can be found in Section 547(c) (including con-
temporaneous transfers) or as court-made defenses such as the earmarking
doctrine.466
What this article attempts to do is portray the fraudulent transfer
action in a light similar to its distant cousin, the preference.4 " To say the
prima facie elements of a fraudulent transfer have been met should not
end the analysis. To the contrary, there presently exists a disjointed body
of law delineating the proper limitations of fraudulent transfer law as
applied to modern transactions. Equipped with the knowledge that a
fraudulent transfer is one that unjustly diminishes the debtor's estate, one
can readily define the contours of that seemingly expansive standard by
focusing on the statutory and common law limitations. This article dis-
cusses four groups of limitations. They are supported by common sense
"" For a discussion of the earmarking doctrine, see Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-
London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1361 (5th Cir. 1986).
41 Second only to the riddle of the Sphinx is the dilemma faced by trustees, more often than they
care to admit: is the transfer under scrutiny a fraudulent transfer or an avoidable preference?
In Butz v. Sohigro Servs. Co. (In re Evans Potato Company, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1984), the trustee sought to recover an alleged voidable preference made by the debtor to
Sohigro. Essentially, the facts were that a principal of the debtor opened a personal account with
Sohigro. Earlier, Sohigro had closed the debtor's account due to unfavorable credit reports. Id. at 192.
Within 90 days of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, Sohigro sold goods to the debtor's principal
who immediately transferred the goods to the debtor for the debtor's use. Id. The debtor paid Sohigro
directly for the goods. These payments were the alleged preferential transfers. Id.
The court held that by applying for a personal line of credit with Sohigro, the debtor's principal
had acknowledged that he alone would be responsible for the ensuing debts. Because it was he who
arranged for the purchase of the goods, it followed that it was he who was responsible for their
payment. Id. at 192-93. The court further observed that the fact that the individual apparently had
the goods delivered to the debtor and arranged for the debtor to pay Sohigro directly did not affect the
nature of the debt owed by the individual. Therefore, the court concluded that because the debtor had
no account and was not liable on the individual's account, the debtor owed nothing to Sohigro. Id. at
193. Based on these facts, the court concluded that no preference existed because there was no debtor/
creditor relationship between the debtor and Sohigro. Id. (and cases cited therein).
The remaining portion of the Evans Potato opinion is strange. After dispensing with the avoida-
ble preference argument, the court, sua sponte, addressed the issue of whether the transfers were
fraudulent under § 548(a)(2). Id. at 193. Naturally, the court addressed the many cases explicating
the general rule that payment of or assumption of a third party's debt by an insolvent is a transfer
without reasonable equivalent value and thus fraudulent. Id. at 193-94. The court noted that the
general rule did not apply. Id. at 194. Although the debtor was not contractually liable for payment
for the goods provided, it nevertheless received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the pay-
ments. One factor the court embraced in support of its conclusion that reasonably equivalent value did
exist was that the debtor had exclusive use of the goods sold by Sohigro. Id.; see also Kindom Ura-
nium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959) (involving a creditor's late recording of a deed).
The facts in Kindom Uranium paint the classic avoidable preference scenario; however, the court
analyzed the late deed recording as a fraudulent transfer. Kindom Uranium, 269 F.2d at 108. The
case is resoundingly criticized in Jackson, supra note 19, at 784-86.
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and are consistent with and accommodate the first principles of fraudulent
transfer law. Armed with the first principles and their limitations, one can
more comfortably undertake the struggle of applying a sixteenth century
law to a twentieth century transaction.
